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ABSTRACT
Verma, Ishita. M.S.E.C.E., Purdue University, August 2011. A Security Analysis of
Smartphones. Major Professor: Brian King.
This work analyzes and discusses the current security environment of today’s (and
future) smartphones, and proposes a security model which will reduce smartphone
vulnerabilities, preserving privacy, integrity and availability of smartphone native
applications to authorized parties. For this purpose, we begin with an overlook of
current smartphone security standards, and explore the threats, vulnerabilities and
attacks on them, that have been uncovered so far with existing popular smartphones.
We also look ahead at the future uses of the smartphones, and the security threats
that these newer applications would introduce. We use this knowledge to construct
a mathematical model, which gives way to policies that should be followed to secure
the smartphone under the model. We finally discuss existing and proposed security
mechanisms that can be incorporated in the smartphone architecture to meet the set
policies, and thus the set security standards.
11. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smartphones, combining telephony and mobile computing, have
emerged as a popular trend in consumer electronics. A smartphone is a category
of mobile device that provides advanced capabilities beyond a typical mobile phone;
running complete operating system software that provides a standardized interface
and platform for application developers [1]. Today’s smartphones combine high util-
ity, mobility and entertainment, owing to device features such as 4G network con-
nectivity, touch screen, accelerometer, GPS, and upto 1.5 GHz processing speed.
Also, smartphones support a sophisticated variety of user applications. However, this
means many of these applications may be security-critical, such as mobile banking,
or may be untrusted such as third-party games. Also accompanying the number of
smartphone applications, there is a corresponding growth in amount of private data
stored unprotected on smartphones.
Generally when compared to feature phones, smartphones have larger displays,
more powerful processors, advanced computing ability and better data and cellular
connectivity [1] [2]. In the spectrum between feature phones and personal computing
devices such as PCs or netbooks, the smartphone has started tending more towards
the latter than the earlier, in terms of computing power and complexity. On one
hand, a smartphone is a mobile phone that offers more advanced computing capabil-
ity and connectivity than a feature phone, and is a truly pervasive mobile computing
device [3]. On the other hand, gradually all applications that are developed for a
desktop are now being redone for the smartphone. However, from a security per-
spective, there are a few essential features that make the smartphone security need
unique; these are:
2• the smartphone is designed to be single-user, and there is no user login.
• the smartphone provides services through independent server processes that are
always on. They always run and are not attached to a user session. As long as
power is supplied, the platform is always on, even if no user is logged on.
• the smartphone, especially with its higher usability enhancements, is meant to
be used by a large public with little technical understanding, when compared
to a desktop.
• the smartphone is an always-connected device, and security breaches in the
smartphone will attack a network much larger than the device itself.
• the smartphone has unique access to both cell communication and data network.
• the smartphone is a constrained embedded device in terms or resources such as
memory, processing and battery life.
• the smartphone is designed to host several applications that leverage its porta-
bility, connectivity and usability.
Statistics indicating the popularity of smartphones have been tending upwards
in recent years. In [4], the authors provided the following information: In December
2010, Nielsen reported that 31 percent of US mobile phone owners have a smartphone.
Morgan Stanley Research estimated that sales of smartphones will exceed those of
PCs in 2012. Gartner stated smartphones accounted for 297 million (19 percent) of
the 1.6 billion mobile phones sold in 2010 and forecasted over 500 million smartphones
to sell in 2012.
Below, see Figure 1.1, illustrates the percent market hold of the most popular
smartphone brands from comScore, Inc. By February 2011 Android held the number
one position with 33.0 percent market share. RIM ranked second with 28.9 percent
market share, followed by Apple with 25.2 percent, Microsoft with 7.7 percent and
Palm with 2.8 percent rounded out the top five. [4]
30.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
Google RIM Apple Microsoft Palm
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Fig. 1.1.: Market share of smartphone brands
Smartphones have shown continued growth in the areas of advanced processing
power, such as currently demonstrated TI four core ARM smartphone processor [5].
Also smartphones are to become more situationally and contextually aware, and offer
decision making information to users based on past preference possibly with help of
background cloud intelligence. Applications such as augmented reality, social net-
works and gaming networks show that smartphone are going to be used in aggrega-
tion with each other; while also increasing the attack surface and raising raise privacy
alarms. Also some more emerging smartphone applications are electronic wallet,
electronic ID, car/home keys, as well as portable hard drive. Hence such ambitious
applications for the smartphone need a well crafted security policy if users expect
fluid connectivity and information sharing, as well as storage of critical data on their
smartphones. [6]
In terms of smartphone usage [6], an average of statistics from October 2010 to
April 2011, shows that 68.2 percent of U.S. mobile subscribers used text messaging
on their mobile device. Browsers were used by 37.2 percent of subscribers, while
downloaded applications were used by 35.4 percent of the mobile audience. Accessing
4of social networking sites or blogs represented 25.6 percent of mobile subscribers.
Playing games represented 24.2 percent of the mobile audience, while listening to
music represented 16.5 percent. Looking at Figure 1.2, we see a dominating column
for telephony and texting. However as the usage patterns of smartphones broaden,
one can soon expect usage of other features to start rising higher. Also applications
like e-wallet and location based services to start dominating, which will bring along
several privacy concerns.
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Fig. 1.2.: U.S. mobile subscription
While there are many ideas for future applications, currently smartphones have
already gained the attention of many security analysts owing to their popularity, ubiq-
uity as well as ongoing incidences of security and privacy breaches on them. As per
a Symantec report, there were 163 known vulnerabilities in mobile operating systems
in 2010, up 42 percent compared to 115 in 2009, and criminals are viewing mobile
phone hacking as a potentially lucrative activity [7]. Similarly, Panda Security’s latest
quarterly malware report found smartphone malware dominated the security land-
scape during the first quarter of 2011. There report highlight several major security
5incidents, including the malicious apps that were found on the Android Market and
the successful attack against HBGary Federal by the Anonymous hacktivist group [8].
Cyber-attackers created 26 percent more new threats in this quarter than they did
during the first quarter of 2010, and 16 percent more than the fourth quarter of 2010.
Also, the laboratory received an average of 73,190 new samples of malware everyday,
of which 70 percent were Trojans. [8]
The pervasive nature of smartphones and a large, unsophisticated user base also
make smartphones prone to attacks. At the same time it is also required to be mindful
of smartphones as computers that support telephony and hence their possible security
impact on and from the communication network. Given below are recent news of
privacy and security breaches on smartphones:
Example 1 As per reports in April 2011 [9] a recent vulnerability in the Voice-over-
IP Skype application for Android, let private user data such as user profile and contact
information and instant message logs unencrypted and in open to be exploited by
hackers.to a report. Moreover, Skype stored the username in a static location, and so
with every device the hacker could parse the same file, get the username and find the
path to Skype’s stored data .
Example 2 In April 2011 Apple [10]updated its Safari browser to fix an issue relating
to its acceptance of security certificates. The vulnerability could have allowed an
attack utilizing fake SSL certificates for a “man in the middle” attack that could have
obtained confidential information from a local network.
Example 3 According to a last quarters e-Week report [8], cyber criminals have
once again been infecting smartphones with malware that generates premium-rate text
messages. Users are unaware of these messages being sent until they receive their
monthly bills. As an example, a Russian gang created a Valentine Day application to
send romantic images, which unwary to the user sent the message to a premium rate
number.
6Example 4 In the same report [8], a smartphone Trojan virus was designed to bypass
the double authentication system implemented by many banks and financial institu-
tions, which prompted users to enter a phone number to which security certificate
should be sent to. When users downloaded the certificate, it had the capability to in-
tercept all SMS messages sent to the phone, such as password codes and security hints
used to secure bank accounts.
Example 5 To improve Apple’s location based services, every 12 hours, an iOS de-
vice’s stored geodata gets anonymized with a random string of numbers, and it gets
transmitted to Apple in a batch. However two data scientists broke the news [11] that
in doing so an unencrypted file was stored iOS devices contains a detailed log of the
device’s geographical data dating back 10 months.
Example 6 Federal prosecutors in New Jersey [12] are investigating whether numer-
ous smartphone applications illegally obtained or transmitted information about their
users without proper disclosures. Federal laws prohibit unauthorized access to infor-
mation. This probe was significant because it involved potentially criminal charges
that could be applicable to numerous companies.
In this work we highlight security and privacy concerns in the growing market of
smartphones and construct security solutions so that current and future applications
be developed securily on this platform. We discuss current smartphone platforms,
reported and contrived security breaches, as well as solutions to fortify smartphone
security. If development for security solutions for smartphones is not kept in pace
with the growth in its applications, a smartphone can risk much about the user from
current and past locations to personal identifying data and from malicious parties
taking control of the device and its services to attacks on the communication channels.
The outline of this study is as follows: Chapter 2 provides background material
on operating system security. Chapter 3 explores current smartphone platforms.
Chapter 4 is a look into some sensitive near future uses of the smartphone. Chapter 4
is an our list of ten categories of smartphone threats and vulnerabilities. Chapter 6,
7is on related work in the field to counterattack some of these threats. Chapter 7 are
four attacks that we recreated and analysed on the smartphone. Having constructed
the threat model, Chapter 7 describes security policies which should be used secure
the smartphone, while Chpater 8 describes a a formal security model and mechanism
for the smarthone. Chapter 9 analyses our proposed solutions against the threats we
had previously presented. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes this work.
82. SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
Smartphones need to be secured from security and privacy violations. A smartphone
is an example of an information system, it can be analyzed from the point of view
of information systems security and privacy. In this chapter, we look at key security
terms, principals and models, that can help us start the security analysis of smart-
phones.
2.1 System Security
Computer security rests on the cornerstones of confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability. A system’s security is assessed by how well it meets the following three basic
requirements:
Confidentiality is the concealment of data or resources, maybe even applying to
whether such data exists or not [13, p. 4]. It is often supported by the use of
access control mechanisms and cryptography. For smartphones, the different
stake holders such as the manufacturer, service provider, application developer,
and above all the user, expects a portion of its on-device data to remain in
confidence, protected from violations by other parties.
Integrity is the prevention of improper or unauthorized change to data and re-
sources in the data [13, p. 5]. It involves authentication prior to data write
or modification. Integrity mechanisms can be preventive as well as detective.
In smartphones, integrity is the guarantee that the information will never be
manipulated by untrusted parties. This includes information passed between
unauthorized subjects, objects, and both. It ensures that user will be able to
9modify, and in some cases, access information only if they explicitly hold the
right to do so
Availability is the provision requested data, resources or services are provided when
required. If a malicious party blocks availability then it is called a denial-of-
service (DOS) attack [13, p. 6]. In a smartphone, the functioning of upper-layer
applications and even security implementations depend on availability of APIs,
the kernel and communication channels. If any of theses are maliciously tied
into performing redundant tasks, and is not able to recover from it, then the
functioning of the device has been crippled.
2.1.1 Secure Design Principles
Saltzer and Schroeder [13, p. 341] draw eight design principles for security systems.
These principles though generic and simple, are surprisingly not necessarily followed
by several present day smartphone manufacturers. The design principles are:
1. A subject should be given only those privileges that it needs in order to complete
a task (Principle of Least privilege). However, coarse grained permissions often
provide a larger subset of permissions, then what smartphone applications really
need to function.
2. Unless a subject is given explicitly access to an object, it should be denied
access to that object (Principle of Fail-Safe defaults). However, many applica-
tions data are by default made publicly viewable, removing the need for other
applications/parties to request for them.
3. Security mechanisms should be as simple as possible(Principle of Economy of
Mechanism). Even though most smartphones try to maintain Mandatory Access
Control, the device incorporates several refinements to the basic security model,
some of which have subtle side effects and make its overall security difficult to
understand.
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4. All access to objects be checked to ensure that they are allowed (Principle
of Complete Mediation). For instance, based on locality, smartphones do not
secure/authenticate physically linked off device communication such as USB.
5. The security of a mechanism should not depend on the secrecy of its design
or implementation (Principle of Open Design). A very prominent smartphone
manufacturer relies on keeping the operating system design a secret, while in
reality the device has been frequently exploited once hackers have been able to
reverse engineer library files.
6. A system should not grant permission based on a single condition (Principle
of Separation of Privilege). In reality, applications are only authenticated at
install time, based on the package certification.
7. Mechanism used to access resources should not be shared (Principle of Least
Common Mechanism). However, in all smartphones, application use the same
APIs, installer, and directly use the same hardware service hooks.
8. Security mechanisms should not make the resource more difficult to access than
if the security mechanism was not present (Principle of Psychological Accept-
ability). However, the constrained resources of a smartphone, make it difficult
to apply common security measures such as anti-malware and firewall, without
significantly impacting the device performance.
2.1.2 Security Policy and Model
In the following chapter, we shall be seeing the formation of a unified security
policy and formal model for smartphones given different threat vectors. Hence, we
now introduce the definitions of the two terms as tools that set the context of a secure
system. What is secure under one policy may not be secure under another. But if we
are able to establish a secure smartphone model under which all foreseeable security
11
issues are handled, then we can move on to base security policies and mechanisms off
the model, in the pursuit of a secured smartphone system.
• A security policy with respect to confidentiality, identifies those states in which
information flow happens to to those not authorized to receive it. With re-
spect to integrity it identifies authorized ways and entities to alter information.
And with respect to availability a security policy defines what services may be
provided [13, p. 99].
• A security model abstracts specific characteristics of policies, and hence repre-
sent that set of policies [13, p. 99].
2.1.3 Access Control
Access control is a system that control access to resources. Access control is
required in smartphones to monitor activities so that confidentiality, integrity and
availability is maintained. There are three type of access control that we can use
alone or together in security policies for smartphones.
• Discretionary Access Control (DAC) bases access rights on the identity of the
subject and the identity of the object involved. Owner of the object can control
who has access to it [13, p. 103].
• Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is rule based access control enforced by the
operating system and unalterable by the subjects or owner of objects [13, p.
103].
• Role Based Acces Control (RBAC) is a form of non-discretionary, mandatory
access control, but it is not based on multilevel security requirements.Access
control decisions are often determined by the roles individual users take on as
part of an organization. This includes the specification of duties, responsibili-
ties, and qualifications. [14]
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We now look at two classic confidentiality and integrity security models, which
have been the basis of many other security models being adapted from them. In
Chapter 7, we would try to derive a mixed security model, using the follow two
models as basis.
2.1.4 Confidentiality Model
The Bell-LaPedula (BLP) model places subjects and objects in a set of security
clearance l arranged in a linear ordering, with the higher the ordering the more
sensitive the data [13, p. 134]. On such a system of security clearances, the following
rules [13, p. 134] are applied to subjects accessing objects :
S can read O if and only if lo ≤ ls and S has discretionary read access to O
S can write O if and only if ls ≤ lo and S has discretionary write access to O
The model focuses on confidentiality, and is mainly applied for military setting for
highly classified information. In order to maintain confidentiality a subject can only
read information at or below the subject’s security clearance level. While it can pass
information to objects at same or higher security clearance. If instead it writes to a
lower clearance, than it may cause leaking some of its own information. As would if
a lower clearance subject is allowed to read information at a higher level.
2.1.5 Integrity Model
The Biba Integrity Model is a formal state transition system of computer security
policy that describes a set of access control rules designed to ensure data integrity.
Data and subjects are grouped into ordered levels of integrity. The model is designed
so that subjects may not corrupt objects in a level ranked higher than the subject,
or be corrupted by objects from a lower level than the subject. It is dual to the
Bell-LaPadula Model, and its rules are [13, p. 155]:
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s ∈ S can read o ∈ O if and only if i(s) ≤ i(o)
s ∈ S can write o ∈ O if and only if i(o) ≤ i(s)
s ∈ S1 can execute s2 ∈ S if and only if i(s2) ≤ i(o2)
The Biba model is a the complement of the BLP model, and if both are strongly
applied to any system, then that would mean that subjects can only read and write
to objects at its own security level. In the Biba model, a subject is allowed to read
at a higher level, but write only at equal or lesser levels. This is because, if a subject
is allowed to read from a lesser trusted source than its own trustworthiness will be
compromised.
2.2 System Privacy
We now look at another facet of security, which is privacy. Information systems
privacy is to protect individual user against the system’s misuse or failure to protect
the user’s the private data [15, p. 595]. Privacy threats can be of the form of data
mining where aggregation of data about individual make large scale correlations easy,
user profiling where user data is gathered off a device piece by piece to recreate a users
identity (Salami attack), as well as identity theft which involves a malicious party
disguising in another users identity to use against information systems [15, p. 595].
Common controls protecting privacy are authentication (pins, passwords, challenge-
response systems, tokens, biometrics and one-time passwords), anonymizers which do
not leave trail of activity, computer voting, pseudonymity and legal controls [15, p.
601].
With smartphones, there is personal data starting to be leaked as soon as the
bare device is switched on, even without privacy violating application add-ons. Even
if the device is disconnected from the data network and is being used as a simple
feature phone, it is holding a host of user information which if retrieved can be traced
back the user’s identity. It is thus important that user privacy is given sufficient
consideration when discussing smartphone security.
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2.2.1 Information Flow
When a system has a security policy regulation information flow, the system must
ensure that the information flows do not violate the constraints of the policy [13, p.
407]. We define it in terms of entropy [13, p. 407], let c be a sequence of commands
taking the system from state s to state t. Let x and y be objects in the system under
the two different states. Then a command sequence c causes a flow of information x
to y provided:
H(xs|yt) < H(xs|ys).
Stated another way, information flow occurs if value of y allows one to deduce in-
formation about the value of x. In a system which is sensitive to user privacy, it is
required that all information flow is secured and does not cause data leaks.
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3. CURRENT SMARTPHONE PLATFORMS
In this chapter we present an overview of current popular smartphone models, namely
Android, Blackberry, iOS, Symbian and Windows Phone 7. For each, the description
is broken down in terms of key security abstractions, in order to contrast the different
mechanisms employed by each smartphone.
The Trusted Computing Platform (TCB) consists of the operating system, applica-
tion framework, and core applications. The Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
chamber has the greatest privileges. The TCB chamber can modify policy and
enforce the security model [16].
The Trusted Computing Environment Figure 3.1 is the rest of the device that needs
to be protected.
Fig. 3.1.: Trusted computing environment
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Processes Capabilities is the system of assigning, changing, and checking process
access and permissions.
Data Confinement is a method of program isolation, where for each application a
visibility level can be set at component level hence keeping data private to the
application.
Installer encompasses all the different channels of entry for outside software to be
loaded and given privileges to execute on the device.
3.1 Android
Trusted Computing Base: The Android software stack is built on the Linux
kernel which manages device drivers, networking and memory and process man-
agement [17]. The TCB utilizes several Linux security mechanisms such as each
application running under a separated POSIX (Portable Operating System In-
terface) userID, and the application resources being available to only processes
of its own userID [18] [17]. With the userIDs, Linux Discretionary Access Con-
trol (DAC) mechanisms can be used for access control [19].
Also permissions that are granted at install time cannot be changed, hence
following a Mandatory Access Control scheme. Even though the Android Source
code is publicly available, the Linux kernel is a highly protected entity and
cannot be altered without manipulating hardware [18].
Trusted Computing Environment: On top of the kernel, the Android comput-
ing environment consists of a layer containing native C-library, SQL database
engine, 2D and 3D graphic libraries, native web browser engine (WebKit) and
media codecs [17]. This is followed by the next layer, which is the a virtual
machine for running the applications. Next the Application Framework layer,
includes Google-supplied tools as well as proprietary extensions or services, such
as a tool for managing the lifecycle of applications on the next (top) layer [17].
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The Android system files contain: operating system relevant files like device
files, drivers, libraries, system binaries etc, Android configuration files, Android
framework relevant files (e.g. android.awt, android.policy, services, etc.), An-
droid base applications (e.g. Launcher, Browser, Phone, Contacts, etc.) [20]
Process Capabilities: Core components and some system processes run with
root privileges. Also, there are no fine grained access control mechanisms for
system processes [18].
At install time signature/system level permissions are granted based on sig-
nature checking. While normal to dangerous protection level permissions are
given after user approval. [18]. Each application has its own userID and it is
authorized its permissions at install time [18].
Data Confinement: Each application runs in its own virtual machine, as a
preventive mechanism against buffer overflow, remote code execution and stack
smashing [18].
However, Android applications can set an “exported” property label of a com-
ponent to true, making it visible to external components that have gained per-
mission to access it [18].
Installer: Developers are required to sign all applications and package it with an
enclosed public key - the signed application is valid until the developer certificate
is valid [18] [20]. Some permissions require user authorization while others are
granted automatically via the adb install feature. Also, user approval is not
fine grained to a subset of permissions that the application request. Lastly,
applications from the same developer have a mechanism of sharing permissions
[18]. Also, the user is able to use self-signed certificates to sign applications and
no central certificate authority is needed [20].
After installation, the application cannot request anymore permissions at run-
time.
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3.2 iOS
Trusted Computing Base: The XNU kernel, and core libraries comes from
the same code base as the Darwin Operating System developed for the Mac
OSX [21] [22]. iOS uses Mandatory Access Controls (MAC) for restricting the
capabilities of applications. Also, sandbox is a kernel extension that restricts a
set of features from being used for some processes. Once a sandbox is applied,
a program cannot access resource out of it [23].
Trusted Computing Environment:
Process Capabilities: To grant process permissions require writing policy files
that describe what permissions an application should have. Users can create
new policies to sandbox applications on their system [23]. Permission granting
for specific functionality is granted via pop-ups to the user at the run-time of
API [23].
Data Confinement: The sandbox is used to partition applications from each
other and to prevent a malicious application from modifying the underlying
system or reading data meant for other applications. Sandbox restrictions are
typically enforced at resource acquisition time. The default seatbelt template
can be examined in /usr/share/sandbox/SandboxTemplate.sb.
Applications are installed under the 5 documented profiles: TCP/IP networking
is prohibited, all sockets-based networking is prohibited, file system writes are
prohibited. File system writes are restricted to the specific/temporary folders,
and all operating system services are prohibited.
Installer: All applications come from the Apple Store. Each application is installed
under its own directory and is identified as a User ID. Applications are allowed
limited read access to some system areas, but are not allowed to read or write
directories belonging to other applications in /private/var/mobile/Applications.
Access to the Address Book and Photos is explicitly allowed.
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3.3 Symbian
Trusted Computing Base: In Nokia Symbian, the trusted computing base
consists of the kernel, the filesystem, and the software installer. Once again
the trusted computing bases is software that enforces permissions and data
confinement. [24]
Trusted Computing Environment: The trusted computing environment con-
sists of the following software layers in the specified order: 1) cellular platform;
2) adaptation layer, that integrates the generic platform with the phone’s cel-
lular platform; 3) operating system layer - from communications, networking,
graphics, multimedia to frameworks, libraries and utilities; 4) middleware layer
which are domains such as multimedia, networking and location service that
serve the application layer, and 5) the application layer which has application
specific UI and engine components. [25]
Process Capabilities: Capabilities are granted to APIs rather than applications,
and they are permission on which applications can access them. The four cat-
egories of capabilities are: 1) open to all - meant for generic basic applications,
all applications can use this API; 2) user granted install time permissions - user
can grant permissions at installation stage; 3) capabilities passed during appli-
cation certification/signing; 4) manufacturer granted permissions for access to
filesystem, DRM or trusted computing base. [24]
Data Confinement: Applications can access their own private directories and
those directories that are marked as open. The four different access types are:
1) resources folder - every application can read this for icons and bitmaps; 2)
system folder - applications are only allowed to be written here at installation
time, and the folder can only be read for backup; 3) private folder- one for each
applications; and 4) the rest of the filesystem, especially containing user data
such as music and documents are open to all applications. [24]
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Installer: The software installer is part of the trusted computing base, and it only
installed symbian signed applications.
3.4 Windows Phone 7
Trusted Computing Base: The kernel and kernel-mode drivers run in the TCB
chamber [16].
Trusted Computing Environment: User Space chambers have fixed permission
sets. The three user space chambers are: 1) the Elevated Rights Chamber that
can access all resources except security policy and its meant for services intended
for use by other phone applications; 2) the Standard Rights Chamber which is
the default chamber for pre-installed applications; and 3) the Least Privileged
Chamber (LPC) which is the default chamber for all non-Microsoft applications
that are available through the Windows Phone Marketplace [26].
Process Capabilities: Applications in the fourth chamber type have capability
requirements, that the developer creates, that are applied at installation and at
run-time [16]. Once installed capabilities cannot be elevated at run time [16].
Data Confinement: The security model has four different types of virtual cham-
bers, each of which has different privileges, to isolate the applications such that
they cannot access memory used or data stored by other applications. Each
chamber has its own policy and the application in it can be further configured
to isolate them from each other within the chamber [26].
Every application is granted a basic set of permissions are granted to all appli-
cations, including access to an isolated storage file [16]. All applications run in a
least-privileged chamber created specifically for the application, and controlled
by a policy system that assigns capabilities based on what the application needs.
Each application gets what it needs, and when application run they are strictly
isolated from each other [16].
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Installer: Developers use Microsoft.NET tools in accordance with specified stan-
dard practices. All applications undergo certification tests by Microsoft and
are code-signed and made available through the Windows Phone Marketplace
Hub. The Windows Internet Explorer Mobile browser cannot install programs
or plugins from other websites, which greatly reduces potential exposure to
malware [16]. All applications installed from theMarketplace Hub, into least
privileges access rights which can be expanded using capabilities [26].
The above information is summarized in Table 3.1
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4. SECURITY SENSITIVE SMARTPHONE
APPLICATIONS
The smartphone is already hosting a multitude of applications, and the security con-
cern with each next generation application is growing. This is because every next ap-
plication has improves on the smartphone’s unique functionalities, but also increases
the risk with information passing and storage.
In this chapter we look at two such applications, which are bound to grow even
more in near future, but which raise the security sensitivity of the smartphone to a
new level. Since the focus of this thesis is to propose very high and even stringent
security solutions, this chapter discusses yet another reason why strict security is
required on smartphone.
4.1 Smartphone as a Server
Using the smartphone as a server for personal usage is a natural direction for the
the smartphone, even more so than using it as a workstation. With the smartphone
increasing in computational complexity, as well as housing
4.1.1 Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
Several how-to tutorials on the Internet, guide users to connect to their smart-
phone device from another computer using the SSH protocol. A key reason for doing
so is that especially once jailbroken, this allows the user to use a big screen and real
keyboard to work on the device, managing files or using terminal that Linux based
smartphones have.
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In installing a SSH server-side application on to a smartphone (which is currenlty
only possible on jailbroken phones), the user has opened the device to receive a
connection request from any other device on the internet which has knowledge of
its IP address. Often these SSH applications that are hacked to be installed on
a smartphone, install with default login key and security setting, common across all
installations. A common user, who is may even have used SSH before, is often familiar
with the client-side application, and does not realize the added hazard of installing
a server side application with minimum protection. Though there are instructions
available on how to create private keyfiles, a user who may only be interested in
file transfer, and is downloading the application via an installation package, would
find it difficult to change security settings via a Unix terminal as in most of these
applications. On the other hand, any can broadcast ping to devices on a subnet,
searching for smartphones and finding their IP addresses.
Moreover, SSH application runs in the background, sometimes without notifying
or warning the smartphone user that the application is running, or has even estab-
lished a connection.
Hence, installation currently SSH server-side violates the policy of introducing a
vulnerability to attacks via the network, without warning to the user. By installing an
application not tailored for a smartphone, but rather an actual server, the smartphone
is exposed to severe security and integrity issues, and hence it is a case of incorrect
implementation of a solution to a functionality sought by smartphone users.
4.1.2 Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
Third party RDP server-side applications are available for the iPhone devices.
RDP has the advantage over SSH to be able to provide a graphical user interface to the
iPhone. User can view their device screen, touch controls and even push the lock and
menu buttons from another computer. However once again there are no passwords
or toggle for the server, risking unauthorized connections. This is a similar policy
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violation of opening a severe vulnerability as a side effect to a sought functionality.
Currently there are Remote Desktop Client available for iOS and Android that enables
the user to connect to their Windows computer across the Internet from the mobile
smartphone devices.
4.2 Smartphone as an E-Wallet
The concept of e-wallet or digital wallet on the smartphone, is to further take
advantage of the people always carrying their smartphones on them. By serving
as an e-wallet, the smartphone could carry quick and secure electronic commerce
transactions. This would combine the wallet functionality to the already merger of
cell phone and a lightweight PC functionalities.
4.2.1 On-Device Banking Application
A technology called Near-Field Communication (NFC) which allows any enabled
device to access the cash register through a secure radio frequency. It is a short ranged
communication technology for exchanging digital content. Of most interest to us, a
smartphone with an NFC chip could make a credit card payment,serve as keycard
or ID card. When a phone is enabled with near-field communication technology,
shoppers can load bank and credit card information onto their phones and then scan
them to buy goods at the grocery store, gas station, subway or any other place set
up to read the device.
Currently, Google has already announced to be using NFC as a mobile payment
system on Android [27]. An Android device with NFC hardware will typically act
as an initiator and will actively look for NFC tags and start activities to handle
them [28].
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4.2.2 E-ID
NFC is also useful in simplified transactions, data exchange, and connecting elec-
tronic devices with a touch. As promoted [29] NFC devices can read NFC tags on a
museum or retail display; and can pair with Bluetooth and share contacts, photos,
songs, applications or videos.
However, the same concept of quick short range communication can be expanded
to support functionalities such as e-ID, e-passport, etc. With more complex crypto-
graphic authentication, and safe storage, smartphones could include scannable iden-
tification information. Eye scans and fingerprints can make phone IDs more secure.
The ID technology might can work as identification papers or security badges, pulls
up personal information when scanned.
4.2.3 Remote Lock
Already cars (such as in the case of the 2011 Chevrolet Cruze) have started fea-
turing with a smartphone enabled remote lock that allows the owner to check the
fuel gauge, lock and unlock the car, set off the horn and lights alarm and perform
onboard diagnostics, such as checking tire pressure, by remote. To do so, the manu-
facturers installs a 13.56MHz, cryptography-protected NCF2970 chip while building
the car. [30] This enables car owners to check status and run diagnostics, once again
via NFC, from their smartphones. Also, of great utility is that the smartphone is
now a location aware set of keys. It can records the car’s last parked position, and
display it on a map application for the owner.
Stepping back, and looking from a security perspective, it is easy to see why it is
now even more critical to protect the smartphone when it enables remote access to
a vehicle. Moreover, a Swedish company is already user testing NFC-enabled phones
as hotel keys [27].
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4.2.4 E-Cash
E-cash is an cryptographic application and was introduced by David Chaum [31]
as an anonymous electronic cash system. The system uses blind signatures to decouple
transactions from the spender/withdrawer [32]. It is based on RSA blind signatures
and fulfils all condition of a physical monetary cash. However, the concept has not
entirely been adopted for the average users. This is why, given that the smartphone
can so takeover all uses of the wallet, it will make e-cash more widely used. This
would bring up the need for secure storage and method to carry out cryptographic
operations securely on the device. There are already applications for storing credit
card information under 256-bit AES encryption.
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5. SMARTPHONE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES
The Smartphone is vulnerable to all kinds of attacks that a desktop is vulnerable to
and more. It uses several off-device communication channels, has always on connec-
tivity, and is used in as data synchronization and transfer. Each of these channels
pose as an attack vector, and they are shown in Figure 5.1. In this chapter we cat-
egorize all threat and vulnerability in classes. We base our categorization on the
knowledge we have of security malfunction in current smartphones.
Fig. 5.1.: Threat channels
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5.1 Wide Attack Surface
An attack surface is the a general term referring to user inputs, protocols, in-
terfaces and services, which altogether comprise the different vectors through which
a device can be threatened. Attack surface be reduced by turning off unnecessary
functionality, having less code available to unauthenticated users, reduce entry points
available to un-trusted users, reduce privilege levels as much as possible, eliminate
services requested by relatively few users, reducing the amount of running code, re-
ducing access to entry points by un-trusted users, reducing privilege to limit damage
potential, looking out for anonymous code paths and watching out for code being
open to less secure protocols (many applications that use TCP also listen for UDP
traffic) [33] [34].
For instance in most cases of smartphones seen so far, applications are sandboxed
and in some cases, installation of third party software is completely disallowed. Also
iPhone mobile safari browser is disallowed to have plug-in like Flash, the ability to
download certain types of file, and the ability to access the file system from the
browser. On the other hand Android does allow Flash plugin, and a recent Flash
vulnerability if exploited on Android can lead to system crashes and code execution
[35].
Furthermore, platforms such as Android and iOS are borrowed from Linux founda-
tions, and hence one major flaw when building a smartphone is to reuse an operating
system from a desktop platform onto the smartphone platform. Though the two
systems may seem to have similar functionalities, just but reducing a much larger
operating system leaves open redundant and possibly harmful functionalities. For
instance ’ setreuid’ and ’setreguid’ previously existed but was later removed from the
iPhone OSX kernel to prevent processes from even requesting to change user and
group IDs [23].
In addition, whenever the smartphone is open to an external communication chan-
nel, the more vulnerable it is to attacks due to discovering addresses during commu-
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nication, compromise of link key database, software errors and incorrect protocol
handling [36]. For instance, iPhone uses a proprietary mechanism called XYMPKI
based off Push IMPA to authenticate to server for Yahoo mail accounts. It was dis-
covered that this custom protocol infact led to a man-in-the middle/replay attack
since it did not support Transport Layer Security (TLS) [37]
Threat 1 The larger the attack surface for a smartphone, the more likely that it will
be exploited.
5.2 Disclosure of Information
Smartphones are used for storing and publishing a significant amount of personal
information. Information may be contained in secure storage if they are of the form of
passwords, financial information or security keys. However, information often exists
close to the attack surface of the smartphone and can be easily exposed. In some cases
even if measures are taken to minimize the amount and type of personal information
disclosed through a smartphone, some information is always leaked which the user
will not be aware of by use of simple functionalities. For instance, most smartphones
transmit the unique device ID to outside of the device whenever a new application is
installed [38]. A survey by the Wall Street Journal [38] showed that the top 101 most
popular smartphone third party applications transmit private data such as current
location, phone numbers, owner’s name, and device IDs to outsiders without owner?s
consent, hence compromising privacy and anonymity. Although, manufacturers such
as Apple and Google require that third party applications obtain users’ permissions
before transmitting any data, often such a policy is not enforced on the devices, and
several applications violate this rule.
Information can be disclosed via third party applications, which should have had
passed better scrutiny before installation. As seen in the case of the Symbian smart-
phone private data such as music and documents are accessible by applications of
any trust level. In case of the Android smartphone, self-signed applications can be
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installed which can cause unaware users installing less tested applications on their
devices.
Information can be disclosed via peripheral devices such as connection to a work-
station or connection to a bluetooth device. Any channel transmitting information
outside the device via an insecure link, and without encrypting the data is open to
data interception. At the same time, information stored externally/off the device,
whether in a workstation backup or on the cloud, without encryption or sufficient
authorization mechanism can be read via unauthorized parties.
Information can be disclosed if the components of the device computing environ-
ment do not correctly read, write and execute only on permitted levels. Hence if data
is shared between applications of different trust levels, or if an top application level
entity such as a browser has direct kernel mode access, then it would compromise
confidentiality and integrity.
Threat 2 With the growing amount of sensitive data being stored on a smartphone,
and the corresponding lack of security in storage, communication and application
installation, the smartphone is open to data theft.
5.3 Deception with False Data
For each security mechanism in place on a device, there is the threat of the mech-
anism being fooled with false data. The biggest threat for spoofing with false data, is
to override/trick security checks. In current times, just as hackers have violated de-
vice policies by downgrading the operating system, they have also been successful in
by passing SIM authorization leading to device ’unlock’ and in installing applications
without proper signature.
As an instance of unauthorized OS downgrade, an Apple security mechanism
validates and verifies every device OS restore via a challenge/response protocol. A
’partial digest’ of the firmware files are sent to the server which verifies and signs it of.
This way the device is protected from being booted with custom/modified firmware,
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as well as old firmwares that have uncovered security vulnerabilities. However, any
such verification model is subject to a simple replay attack, where one just stores a
copy of Apple’s sign off and then returns it at a later point.
Some phones are locked to a particular carrier’s SIM card. This is done via a code
on the SIM that corresponds to the users account in the mobile carrier’s database,
three set digits of which is the Mobile Network Code (MNC) number identifying the
carrier. When the phone baseband is loaded in memory, one of the things it verifies
is the MNC against its network lock state, before activating the cell radio. For a
smartphone with a more protected verification code, a simpler way is to ’unlock’ the
carrier is with a simple hardware clip that fits between the SIM chip and the reader.
This clip spoofs information to bypass the authorization check.
All smartphone platforms have an official manufacturer controlled code signing
and certification mechanism. Some have a tightly confined system of only allowing
signed code from select authorities. However, several means of bypassing code-signing
through pseudo-certification, unauthorized self-signing, and bypassing certification
checks are already well employed. iPhone hacker Jay Freeman, has published instruc-
tions on his blog [39] on obtaining self-signed developer certificates and generating
SHA1 hashes that are checked by the kernel. Both of which are examples of deception
with false data.
Threat 3 Security mechanisms are easier to bypass if authentication and Verification
is not done more rigourously.
5.4 Disruption of Correct Operation
A frequent hack, especially for the purpose of jailbreaking (see Section 7.1) is to
place the device in firmware upgrade mode and to then skip code verification during
the bootloading process to mount an unsigned kernel.
On start-up, the iPhone calls upon three stages of boot-loading, which is a boot-
strapping process that starts the iOS. The first stage boot-loader is called the BootROM
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or SecureROM. It calls the Low Level Bootloader (LLB) that runs several setup rou-
tines and checks the signature of the third stage bootloader or iBoot before calling
it [40, LLB]. This brings up the Recovery/Restore Mode, which is run from Apple
RAM-disk during a restore or update. It has an interactive interface which can be
used over Universal Serial Bus (USB) or serial to connect with the Apple iTunes in-
terface which can re-flash the device with a new OS [40, Recovery Mode]. A critical
jailbreak is that while executing the LLB bootloader, signature checking fails causing
the device to stay in Device Firmware Update (DFU) mode. The DFU mode unlike
Restore/Recover Mode bypasses the current installed operating system and allows
the device to be upgraded or downgraded [40, DFU Mode].
Threat 4 Malicious parties can seize control by disrupting the secure flow of opera-
tions.
5.5 Unauthorized Control of Part of the Device
User space hacks can often lead to an application gaining access of the filesystem
in part of whole, which it was previously not authorized to. Once again, taking the
example of the iphone, user space exploits have been executed to gain access to the
entire filesystem, thus overthrowing mechanisms such as data confinement. In the
case of the iPhone, hackers having gained access to a kernel file called fstab, can
modify it to mount the System partition as read-write [40, Restore Mode]. The fstab
(/etc/fstab) (or file systems table) file is a system configuration file commonly found
on Unix systems. The fstab file typically lists all available disks and disk partitions,
and indicates how they are to be initialized or otherwise integrated into the overall
system’s file system [41].
In cases where rootkits are installed, malicious parties can take over kernel func-
tions. Bickford, et. al. [42] demonstrated how rootkits can enable tracking the user
over GPS, hearing into private conversations, stealthily switching on bluetooth and
draining battery on an OpenMoko phone.
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As we attempted by ourselves, server side SSH installation with known login
that can allows an unauthorized user to remotely launch applications on a jailbroken
iPhone.
Threat 5 If the system is partitioned into different security levels, a vulnerability in
any one of them can allow for access and control of all code running at that level.
5.6 Threats to the Cellular Network
Smartphones are connected both with the Internet and the cellular network. This
makes it possible to move botnets as data packages which over the internet or over
SMS. Such malware propagation would be similar to the case of viruses and tro-
jan for workstations over the internet. Attackers can use Smartphone to compro-
mise other devices, computers, or networks by running network or port scanners,
SMS/MMS/email worms, as well as compromise internal/protected network. Though
in the case of the data network we can have secured/firewalled enterprise networks
monitoring network activity, as well as protected data channels; such mechanisms are
missing in the cellular network. Also, core network targets, such as DNS in case of
the internet, are often hit with denial of service attacks. However as noted in [43],
even though the internet is more resilient to such attacks, cellular networks have more
rigid hierarchical dependencies and are more vulnerable.
Traynor, et al in [43] point out that a relatively small number cellular botnets can
collapse a targeted cellular core network. They theoretically measure the potential
impact of a hypothetical botnet through a combination of measurement, simulation
and analysis showing that a botnets infecting 11,750 compromised mobile phones can
degrade service to area-code sized regions by 93%. They simulated denial-or-service
attacks, on network bottleneck regions. The attackers can evaded users’ attention by
make service requests instead of active calls, for flooding network centerpoints.
Additionally, Mulliner, et al in [44] describe the architecture and even implement
a cellular botnet for the iPhone. They tried a combination of scenarios for communi-
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cation from the botmaster to the botnet: over SMS only and over SMS and IP. They
thus show that with the presence of internet connectivity botnets can be more ad-
vance transporting larger data to and from device, stealing information or upgrading
the botnet. This makes smartphone botnets more dangerous than those on feature
phones.
Threat 6 The smartphone is vulnerable to being highjacked via cellular network bot-
nets.
5.7 Threat from Very Restrictive Application Marketplace
Each smartphone vendor have a different mechanism of allowing application dis-
tribution and installation. It ranges from a very restricted marketplace to a no re-
striction on application installation at all. With full control of third party software
installation, as with the iPhone, the vendor can closely check for quality and secu-
rity adherence, enforce code signing, and revoke applications if they turn out to be
malicious. With a totally free market place, as with the Android, the vendor sees
much higher growth in number and variety of applications being developed for their
platform. As an in-between mechanism, the vendor can delegate security guardian
responsibilities to another entity, such as mobile phone carrier or enterprise system
administrator [45] which then maintain a blacklist of revoked application.
However, going to either a close monopolistic or unmonitored free market are high
threats to smartphones. While platforms with no restriction on application installa-
tion, see most number of malware and phising attacks, being a closed market as seen
more hazardous attacks. In case of the iPhone, restrictions on application installation,
lead to many user ‘jailbreaking’ their iPhones. Apple’s policy on adopting applications
for the official AppStore is based on two criteria: functional restrictions and content
restrictions [46]. Functional restriction are where concrete security measures should
be applied. For instance one functional restriction is not allowing applications that
synchronize data using the wifi protocol [46]. Another restriction on earlier iPhones
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were to not use the camera to record video. This lead to an unauthorized third party
application which could record videos on jailbroken phones. Content restrictions are
even more discretionary and may not always be appreciated by the users. One famous
case is Apples rejection in 2009 of the app NewsToons by the cartoonist Mark Fiore,
which criticizes the White House. But the application was accepted in 2010 only
after the author won the Pulitzer Prize [46]. There are other forms of checking such
as user interface aesthetics and checks for security violation, but no further details
are provided on the actual approval mechanism. Popular iPhone hacker Jay Freeman
estimates that more than 10% of all iPhones are jailbroken [39].
Threat 7 By now allowing certain amount of flexibility in application development
and installation, users may instead willing bypass security mechanisms introducing
more vulnerabilities.
5.8 Application Level Malware
For security mechanisms to work, it should be a viable assumption that the secu-
rity services can rely on the kernel to supply correct data. Malware can find entry to
a device via social-engineer techniques or by communication vectors on the smpart-
phone. Once there, a malware can remotely control a device, modify the filesystem,
expose confined data, install rootkit, and breach the device security policy in general.
After this, permission escalation is to maliciously using the permissions granted
to an installed application. One attack that effected several smartphone was the
Webkit web browser attack, which was done through a buffer overflow in an outdated
native library and a cross-site scripting vulnerability, which allowed the hacker to run
malicious code on the device using the browsers high privileges. This was able to be
done and lead to a userspace jailbreak (complete control of the filesystem) because
the browser application was running at the kernel trust level.
Threat 8 The smartphone is vulnerable to application layer malwares
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5.9 Kernel Level Malware - Rootkits
Kernel level malware exploit a vulnerability in the operating system kernel or
system libraries. Rootkits can do malicious activities such as stealthily placing a
call, listening into confidential conversation, read and send location data, and drain
resouces such as battery [42]. At the microkernel level, the rootkit gains full access of
the target system, by being able to inspect all communication between the operating
system and the hardware, as well as evade detection with this more control [47].
Threat 9 The smartphone is vulnerable to rootkits
5.10 Insecure Data Transfer
Malware infections can spread from a smartphone to other devices that it is con-
nected to via peripherial links and vice versa, showing a crossing-over behavior. In
2005 Cardtrap.A was a Symbian SIS file Trojan not only disabled application on the
cell phones, it also installed three Windows worm on the device’s memory card which
would move to the workstation once the card in inserted in it [36]. In 2006 Crossover
virus moved from the Windows workstations to Windows Mobile Pocket PC [36].
Similarly [48] showed three attacks via the USB link in the three areas of device to
computer, computer to device and device to device. Such attacks were possible be-
cause the syncing, backup and removable media mechanisms are not well secured in
most smartphones.
Threat 10 Without proper security data being moved outside the device can lead
to both contamination/unauthorized modification of data, as well as loss of sensitive
information.
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6. EXISTING MECHANISMS
In Chapter 5, we presented a discussion on common smartphone threats and vulner-
abilities. In this chapter we present related works done on countering some of the
mentioned threats. We discuss existing mechanisms in the broad catergories of ensur-
ing kernel integrity, preventing data leak, and detecting and preventing malware. We
note that these solutions are ad-ons, often like security enabling applications, to the
existing smartphone platform. In later chapter, we will present out solution which is
a redefinition of the smartphone security platform itself.
6.1 Ensuring Kernel Integrity
The NSA created Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) by implementing Manda-
tory Access Control (MAC) on Linux. MAC access decisions are based on labels
which are enforced over all subjects (processes) and objects (e.g. files, sockets, net-
work interfaces) in the system. MAC can support a wide variety of categories of users
on a system, and it can contain the damage that can be caused by flawed or malicious
software.
The iPhone permission system is based on the TrustedBSD framework.Following
the Trusted BSD framework, to grant process permissions require writing policy files
that describe what permissions an application should have. Users can create new
policies to sandbox applications on their system. [23]
Similar to it since smartphone operating systems such as the OSx, iOS and An-
droid are subsystems of the Linux kernels, it is possible to apply SELinux to the
these them. SELinux can limit the abilities of root processes and otherwise poten-
tially vulnerable or high-priority entities, so that even if they are compromised the
attack is cause less damage. The SELinux policy can support separation policies that
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can enforce restrictions on data, establish well defined user roles, or restrict access to
classified data, containment policies useful for such things as restricting web server
access to only authorized data and minimizing damage caused by viruses and other
malicious code, integrity policies that are capable of protecting unauthorized modifi-
cations to data and applications, and invocation policies that can guarantee data is
processed as required.
In [49] the authors claimed that Linux Security Moducles based approaches such
as SELinux as it focuses on enforcing least privilege, and its policies on personal
computer systems are too complex to understand integrity completely.Hence, they
developed a and modified and compacted SELinux policy to build a high integrity
phone system, and later tested the integrity of a phone system using the Policy
Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture (PRIMA) approach.
6.2 Preventing Data Leaks
In order to secure the operating system on a smartphone, there needs to be a
custom access control policy. Unix systems use Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
mechanisms, where any program executed by the user inherits all of the privileges
associated with that user. Only two categories of subjects are supported: the ad-
ministrator and normal user. In all this is a coarse-grained policy, and any malicious
program which has obtained super user privileges can change permission associated
with all object and disclose them for other programs. DAC access decisions are only
based on user identity and ownership, ignoring other security-relevant information
such as the role of the user, the function and trustworthiness of the program, and
the sensitivity and integrity of the data. Also such a policy is not mindful of the fact
that all application may need to be classified into more than just two security levels
depending on their source, signing authority, and objects such as processes, sockets,
files and other resources that they need.
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Data leaks can be internal as well as to the outside of the device. Some of the most
sensitive as well as commonly requested permissions is to use geolocation features or
read data from the camera. Such permissions should be discerenly granted once
again depending to the overall security required by the user as well as the source
of the application code. GPS, camera and audio should not be accessible directly
without using a trusted API created to transfer information.
The likelihood of privilege escalation can be reduced by means of a memory man-
agement unit (as done in Android), which sequesters processes in memory space, so
that a process is unable make its own code run in a privileged mode by means of
overwriting the private OS memory (protect integrity) [17]. Also this way a pro-
cess is unable to read the memory pages of another process (protect confidentiality/
information disclosure), or flood its memory (protect availability).
Sensitive private data (such as messages, contacts, emails, notes, audio/video,
images and documented) can be encrypted using a user input key so that the infor-
mation is secure even if an attacker steals the device and has full access to it. This
way by not having the device alone encrypt such data, the key is stored not on the
device itself, but is with the user of the device.
On the Windows phone there are no communication channels between applications
on the phone other than through the cloud [16]. Though this may be effective, its is
a highly restrictive security measure.
To prevent data loss in case of phone theft, user authentication and authorization
can be done by the SIM containing a secret known by the card and the operator.
Data elements type that are passed by the Android-specific Inter-Process Com-
munication (IPC) mechanism, is defined by the developer on compile time to ensure
that types are preserved across process boundaries [17].
Resource management consists of fairly allocating resources to applications ac-
cording to their needs and importance (for example, the phone application is very
important and should thus receive more CPU than a game). In this case, unsuper-
vised resource drainage is not possible. If a resource management solution maintains
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disk storage quotas and disk and network I/O are rate limited and permitted up to
a certain quota, then it can fully mitigate a DoS attack [18].
6.3 Preventing and Detecting Malware
Even for smartphones that are Linux based, off the shelf security from malware
cannot be utilized most times owing to issues with dependencies, size and resource
usage. Even then anti-malware tools are being developed. For instance, the authors
is [20] statically compiled an anti-virus open source unix tool called Clam AntiVirus2
for the Android phone and found that 28MB space required exceeded the 21MB
system space, and the virus checking database had to placed in a different location.
There are several approaches to host based intrusion detection rootkit detection which
are effective against the malware threats.
The Linux application level provides all the functionality needed for monitoring
and storing device and operating system information. On Java application level,
anomaly detection, detection collaboration, and detection response are realized where
the corresponding states can be visualized in a user interface. [20]
Signature Based Malware Detection
Signature-based anti-virus solutions for mobile device are useful for postinfection
cleanup, and to match signatures to a malware database they may seek too much of
constrainted mobile resources. Also they are prone to malware signature changing by
obfuscation, polymorphism and packing techniques.
Behavior based Malware Detection
It [36] an alternative to signature-based mobile malware detection in form of be-
havioral detection where the run-time behavior of an application (e.g., file accesses,
API calls) is monitored and compared against a set of malicious and/or normal behav-
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ior profiles. This involved first reconstructing higher-level behavior signatures online
from lower-level system calls and file accesses; second reconstructing these signatures
during run-time by monitoring system calls and resource accesses.
Mobile Trusted Module
The Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) is a security element for use in mobile and
embedded devices [50]. A hardware based counter-measure to both jailbreaking and
rootkit would be a Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) [50] [51]. One suggestion is that
the MTM takes integrity measurement of software stack as SHA-1 hashes and store
it in secure hardware which can be called ready by a verification authority such as a
service provider [52].
Kim, et al. [51] show the design and implementation of a Mobile Trusted Module
(MTM) is presernted which satisfies small area and low-power condition.
Coprocessor
A coprocessor based technique is proposed in [52], where the authors suggest
deploying malware or virus detection/prevention software on to a workstation that
the smartphone often synchronizes its content with using the USB connection. This
would mean that the workstation is capable of accessing the phone’s filesystem, as
well as store hash of all files onto the workstation. On subsequent connections, the
phone would compute and send hashes of all files to the computer, which in turn
would copy and scan those files whose hash values have changed. Using a keyed hash
technique which requires a key from the workstation would prevent any rootkit on
the phone from storing hash values of files before modification.
Additionaly, [52] makes the suggestion of detecting rootkit by placing a challenge
onto the phone in the form of a complex function call or computation which would
give a higher running time on a phone with rootkit. Similarly, a memory challenge
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of asking the phone to temporarily copy data equivalent to expected free space could
signal if there are any other rootkit code occupying space in memory.
A coprocessor-based strategy, however, places significant trust on an untrusted
device i.e. the workstation by giving it access to the filesystem. Smartphone memory
access via PCI card [53] and Firewire has been suggested. A coprocessor is thus a
kernel integrity monitor that does not rely on the kernel for access to main memory
and requires no modifications to the protected host’s software.
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7. SMARTPHONE HACKS, ATTACKS AND
JAILBREAKING
All code has a nonzero probability of containing vulnerabilities and although mini-
mizing threats and patching known vulnerabilities prevent security failures, it does
not mitigate the amount of damage an attacker could inflict once a vulnerability is
found. In this chapter, we duplicated a couple of simple but severe attacks, which
help us understand common security negligence which can severely compromise the
security framework of the smartphone.
7.1 Jailbreaking
Jailbreaking is the process of removing restrictions on application installation and
directory access, set by the manufacturer on the device. It is also a precedent step for
SIM-unlocking, the act using the device with any carrier SIM card. For this reason,
even phones with no restriction on application installations maybe jailbroken if they is
not flexibility in choice of service provider when purchasing the device. Jailbreaking,
opens the device to uncertified market place where application developer enthusiasts
can create functional applications that the manufacturer is not providing, even though
these application may have severe vulnerabilities. More importantly, jailbreaking also
disables all on-device security mechanisms and leave the device open for attack and
installation of unverified code. Jailbreaking is most popular with the iPhone platform,
and so in this section we look at how jailbreaking (which in a way is user consented
attack to the device, without sufficient premeditation from a security viewpoint) has
been carrier out on the iPhone.
For security mechanisms to work, it should be a viable assumption that the se-
curity services can rely on the kernel to supply correct data. The iPhone uses a
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signed kernel to prevent tampering, however all iPhone kernel version till date have
been exploited via different security flaws [54]. The hacking community surrounding
smartphones has devised several tools and techniques to assist with the process of
jailbreaking the device to allow installation of third party software and unlocking to
use an unapproved carrier SIM card, dating back to 2007 when the iPhone was first
released closed to to third party application installations [54].
Table 7.1 is a list of a few critical jailbreaks on the iPhone, alongside the exploit
and the vulnerability. The data is taken from what is shared with public by the
informal jailbreaking hacker community behind the iPhone.
7.2 Data Exported to Insecure Devices
The smartphone has to be often synced to backup personal information and ap-
plication files. This is important in case the device data on device is lost. Often a
software is trusted to sync running on a personal workstation, eg. for iPhone it is
iTune and for Windows Phone it is Microsoft Zune. One reason for having a specific
software to sync the device is to automate quick backups as the software detects and
backups data from set file partitions. The off-device software is also used to detect
operating system version and administer OS upgrades. Another utility could have
been to secure data transfer with more security, though as from the first userspace
attack in Table 7.1 we know this is not the case.
An important consideration to be made here, is that even though security mech-
anisms are added to data transfer and storage; a syncing-software can not be con-
sidered trusted since it resides on an untrusted workstation. Any malicious software
can mimic the protocol even if security authorizations were present, since the work-
station itself can be malicious. Hence not all files can be allowed to leave the device
in raw form. Also, storage on an untrusted device is inherently untrusted. Even after
encrypted, if the encryption keys are stored with the file, then it is a security flaw.
Forensic analyst, Jonathan Zdziarski was the first to demonstrate in 2008, a low
level but shocking experiment behind iPhone backups, reveling that they are infact
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Table 7.1: List of important jailbreaks
Name Exploit Vulnerability
UserSpace Modified the Apple File Connection The (AFC) lied in the
Exploit (AFC)service which syncs with iTunes, non-OS partition
by adding a service that runs as root
UserSpace Used the command cp iBoot to copy the Redundant functionality:
Exploit fstab(unix files listing disk the command cp iBoot
partitions) to userspace had filesystem access
Pwnage In the bootloading, though iBoot bootrom did not
signature checked the kernel,Low signature check LLB
Level Bootloader (LLB) did not check
iBoot and bootrom did not check LLB
ARM7 Go Two iBoot debug commands left behind: allows unsigned
arm7 stop and arm7 go, which could ARM7 code on
have the coprocessor execute code coprocessor partition
JailbreakMe buffer overflow in libtiff file Webkit browser had
modifies kernel space data to access to kernel
circumvent security checks, calls memory with write
setuid(0) to get root access privilege
unencrypted. In our attack, we manually retrieved the backup files located on the
PC disk. Each application has a folder which is named same as the application ID
from Apple Store. We then recovered the data from backedup files by restoring them
to their correct formats. We noted that the fact that iTunes sets a password for these
backups had no security benefit to prevent uncovering the data outside of iTunes.
This experiment infact proved two attack concerns: 1) that we are able to backup
information from the smartphone and then extract this information with a second
application that was non trusted to the smartphone. This undermines any security
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functionality of iTunes. 2) It also showed that a quick backup to a foreign workstation
can infact be of the the simplest ways to steal data from the device. This is especially
true, given that a few of the files that were found in the backups of even unjailbroken
phones were the location database, personal multimedia, application backups and
passwords.
7.3 Exposing Private Data
It was discovered in 2011 by two software hackers [55] that an unencrypted file
resided in Apple iOS called “consolidated.db” containing extensive location informa-
tion. This is critical not only because it is done unknown to the user, but because
it is easily accessible on the iOS userspace directory. The official Apple statement
in defense was that Apple as the manufacturer stores information about nearby cell
towers and WiFi access points on the device which was later collected by Apple after
anonymizing the source from the data. The data gets transferred outside the device
without user consent, whenever the device connected to a Wifi network.
In our experiment we were able extract this file both from iPhone backups and by
access to an open directory location on the device, accessible to the user by jailbreak-
ing it. It was noted that the log was extensive, and spanned several months. The
“consolidated.db” file contained several tables, the most prominent being two tables
called Wifi location harvest and Cell location harvest. For both tables, each entries
had timestamp, latitude and longitude information besides other fields. For the Wifi
location, the table also had a MAC address field for each entry. Further research into
older statements from Apple revealed to us, that Apple was developing a ‘quasi-GPS’
method for location detection called Skyhook [56]. In order to populate Skyhook
with location data, users in 2008 were encouraged to submit latitude and longitude
information by revealing their addresses as well as the WiFi point associated with the
designated location and detected by the smartphone. It then seems, that Apple since
48
moved to secretly and autonomously make devices collect and transmit this data.
However, this scheme has two major security concerns.
First, Wifi location refers to discovery of routers and this is transmitting data not
only about the user or device, but about other devices in the environment. Also, cell
locations are always known by the base stations and the user is aware of that. Also
the service provided is authorized to have cell location, but it is not clear why should
the manufacturer should be authorized to know cell location. Hence this is a violation
of the principle of least privilege.
Fig. 7.1.: Location based attack
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Second, we plotted Wifi and cell location data from several iPhones to assess how
much information is reyvealed. In Figure 7.1 we see the latitude and longitude entries
plotted from one of the tables from one of the iPhones. As apparent, this map gives a
lot of information about the party. Not only does it present clusters of regions where
the user was mostly present, it leaks significant information on the users activities
and locations over a some months.
7.4 Detection Over Network and SSH Attack
We see that smartphones are easily detected smartphones over a subnet. In our
experiement, we sequentially scanned the subnet for smartphones, identifying them
by their TTL (Time to Live) value. We knew that jailbroken iPhones get a default
root password assigned and often have the secure shell server installed. Hence, after
identifying a device, we used its public IP to attempt to create an SSH connection
with each device, looking for plausible jailbroken devices with SSH server installed.
Once a connection was established, we found that with server access and root control
of a smartphone, we could remotely start and exit applications as well as view the
entire filesystem. We also noted that smartphones, especially in unmonitored public
networks can be attacked via constant pinging. This is a denial of service attack not
only because it effects network traffic to the device, but also because it drains its
power.
For the network detection attack technique, smartphones are vulnerable to be
detected by network malware, which can be in the form of worm and viruses (some
recent ones being named Code Red, Nimda, and Slammer). These are characterized as
bot networks or topological worms. In [36] it was demonstrated how the Cabir virus
can spread among the cellular network via Bluetooth, and how another worm can
exploit email and peer-to-peer file sharing to infect the enterprise network. This can
happen because, once one device is affected, the malware can spread throughtout the
network via 1) proximity scanning for close range wireless channels such as bluetooth
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or Infrared; 2) history scanning monitoring phone and sms history; 3) topological
scanning by searching address books, URLs, application data cache, etc; 4) sequential
subnet scanning.
As for the other half of the attack involving SSH server, we see that if one can
also make a connection with a server on the smartphone, we can remotely access
its filesystem and control applications. In November 2009 a hacker had exploited
this vulnerability to create a worm was named Ikee.A [57] which infected around
21000 iPhones within two weeks by simply copying itself via secure copy (part of
ssh)from iPhone to iPhone. Later somebody added a very simple command and
control mechanism to Ikee to turn it into a botnet, this botnet was called Ikee.B [57].
The command and control mechanism was simply polling a webserver to download
and run a shell script.
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8. SMARTPHONE SECURITY POLICIES
On any smartphone device the parties each with some guarantee of access are the
smartphone owner(s), the person presently in access of the smartphone, application
framework developers, third party application developers, operating system devel-
oper/community, local subnet (if open to bluetooth or WiFi area), the device manu-
facturer, network carrier/service provider and the government which owns the network
bandwidth.
The types of resources and information stored on a smartphone range from hard-
ware device drivers, system/kernel files, application framework files, permission files,
password files, application files and user data. What’s open for the users are their own
data and executables for installed application. By default the kernel has the highest
security level access. Kernel and system files are unaccessible and can be invoked
only through the given API, even though they can be directly patched by permission
held by the device manufacturer, or reistalled with newer version as provided by the
OS provider. Applications are given restricted acess to anything beyond their own
data set, though more than one applications can combine to leverage into higher ac-
cess permissions. The guarantee for the network service provider’s SIM recognition
is handled by hardware modules, or as in current iPhone version with Verizon, the
SIM is eliminated and carrier capabilities are hard coded in the hardware. In terms
of priority in terms of amount of control held by each party, the user can be seen to
be at the end of the chain with least control or device modification capabilities. This
may serve to prevent misuse of device to harm the technology or network, however
with least privileges the user can be being put at a disadvantage or even risk.
A smartphone security policy would define whether a smartphone is secure or
insecure. A Smartphone should have explicitly stated security requirements, which
are statements about what and how should it function. These requirements would be
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a collection of well-defined, consistent, and implementable rules that are clearly and
unambiguously expressed [15]. A policy set defines rules such as what generic security
rule should be invoked by default and what device functionalities are important and
should be protected. Also, given that a smartphone has various stakeholders, namely
user, manufacturer, cellular service provider, and well as any network that the device
is being used in, each of these different viewpoints have different security rights.The
purpose for such policies are that if the device implements these requirements then
1. It can be said to have met the security expectations from the view of the different
stakeholders.
2. It would have secured itself from being exploited owing to traits such as ubiquity,
computing complexity, portability, single user ownership, and connection to
data and telecommunication networks.
After having viewed the different smartphone platforms, we now discuss the differ-
ent policies that are or should be followed under the different components for the
smartphone; each having its own set or rules.
8.1 Policies for Application Installations
Beyond the static kernel model, at application installation and runtime the kernel
as well as installation medium should provide certification as well as enforce them for
the applications. Applications should be installed and run under well defined security
levels. Since the number of applications on a single smartphone market can go to an
amount of hundreds of thousands, certainly not all applications can be treated with
same trust level. Hence, there should be multiple trust levels for applications, and
information on an applications minimum basic security permission as well as the range
up to which its security level can be elevated should be set at the time of installation.
Trust level on applications can be differentiated on the grounds of provider, role and
installation source.
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K1: Applications should be granted security permissions based on source, installation
mechanism, security level of installing userID, sensitivity of application and
its data, amount of resource requested, amount or privileges requested and
proximity to the kernel. For this applications should be signed by the developer
validating its security and integrity, by the user and by the installer. Also
application should then undergo multiple confirmation before they can escalate
their security privileges.
K2: When the kernel allows an application executable to be run, it must ensure that
its certification is valid.
K3: For some applications, the kernel must transform them from one security level
to another.
K4: For every application, an allowed tuple (application, data item) should be tracked.
Thus putting it under a security level.
K5: The kernel must authenticate every application at run time. This is per appli-
cation call, not system startup.
K6: As suggested in the Clark-Wilson security model, the kernel should append a
log of all application calls, of enough information to reconstruct the operation.
A1: (Application) Only the certifier of an application may change its policy list.
A2: Any application that takes a data item may only perform valid operations as
defined by its policy file.
A3: Application which provided added functionalities requiring an escalation of trust
level should prompt user requesting such permissions at runtime. Also users
must have the capability of canceling such previously granted permissions. The
ability to grant and cancel up to a level of privacy permission is part of providing
the user the flexibility of choosing between utility and privacy.
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A4: Applications should be given only those privileges that it needs in order to
complete a task (least privilege principle).
A5: Applications should be explicitly given access to an object, else they should be
denied access to that object (fail-safe defaults principle).
A6: Application mechanisms used to access resources should not be shared (least
common mechanism principle).
A7: Application installation mechanisms, between application of different security
levels should not be shared.
A8: Applications developed by third party should have direct write access to critical
files such as location, keychain, contact, etc databases.
A9: Critical applications should be protected and should not be able to be called by
applications of lesser trust or remotely. For instance, be able to switch telephony
on/off remotely.
A10: Applications should be packaged with a easy to read privacy policy. The user
should be able to have a view of every installed applications privacy policy
via a build in viewing application which parses and displays the policy file
content. This is because, during its lifetime on a device an application may go
several run time permission changes, and the user must be able to view at what
access level is the current application running. Also, all applications which are
available publicly should have their privacy policy displayed in a form which
is graspable to the average user (such as a matrix) on a public location. Such
an application policy requirement is similar to the W3C standard on privacy
policy for websites.
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8.2 Policies for Maintaining Kernel Security
K7: The device kernel should have multiple signature checking when installing any
files to modify the operating system
K8: The device kernel security mechanisms should not make the resource more dif-
ficult to access than if the security mechanism was not present (psychological
acceptability).
K9: The device kernel should enforce simple as possible security mechanisms (econ-
omy of mechanism).
K10: The device kernel should not depend on the secrecy of its design or implemen-
tation as a security mechanism (open design).
8.3 Policies for Off-Device Communication
For a smartphone the different communication channels are:
1. cell communication part of service provider channel (SIM card)
2. manufacturer channel (net/tethered based)
3. physical channel
4. general communication channel (IR, GPS, 3G/4G (VPN + Service Provider),
Wifi, Radio, bluetooth)
C1 (Communication): The communication channels should be differentiated be-
tween secured and unsecured channels.
C2: The communication channels security mechanisms should not make access to
valid communication channels or network more difficult to access than if the
security mechanism was not present.
C3: The communication channel should not establish link based on a single condition.
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C4: The different communication channels should have separate and independent
resources.
C5: The communication channels should not authorize transmission of any data on
device outside the device without user authorization.
C6: Presence of a communication channel should revel no new information about the
device. Stated in term of entropy:
H ( device | cell communication, another channel, UserNACK)
= H ( device | cell communication)
C7: The communication channels should have security mechanisms for hosting ap-
plications such as augmented reality, context aware intelligence and multi-users
gaming, without causing privacy leaks regarding the user or the device. Such
applications make not just an emerging direction for future of the smartphone,
they also require huge overlapping communication among several devices. In or-
der for such applications to take off, there should be a protocol guaranteeing an
acceptable level of anonymity as well as flexibility to modify user’s permissions
regarding them.
8.4 Policies for On-Device Information Flow
The device should treat process launched by the following parties in a decreasing
level of trust: Kernel (and all OS provider signed patches); core application, virtual
machines and software libraries; user installed applications; authorized/trusted online
repository(ies); external device connections. Hence no operating system software
patch/code that can do kernel level modifications can be allowed to be installed via
an external device, since by their nature they have been classified as untrusted. Also,
no core applications, virtual machines and software libraries can be be installed via
an external device, for the same reason as above. An alternative to this is that all
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of the above item should come pre-installed from the manufacturers, or should be
available via secure direct download onto the device.
K11: (Kernel) The device kernel should have secure encrypted storage for high
privacy user data. Such storage should not only be unreachable by any unau-
thorized on-device application, external device or been transmitted. Any such
implementation of such a storage is needed for smartphone applications such as
digital wallet, passport or ID.
K12: The device kernel should have separate storage and handling of data that is
locked to the device, and that which can be accessed or synchronized with
external devices or the cloud.
K13: The device should not be able to update any system file via a medium whose
trust level is lesser than the kernel itself.
K14: The device kernel should not grant permission based on a single condition.
K15: The device kernel must be able to enforce the separation of information based
on confidentiality and integrity requirements to provide system security.
K16: The device kernel to check all access to objects to ensure that they are allowed
(complete mediation).
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9. FORMAL SECURITY MODEL AND MECHANISMS
A formal policy model is a highly abstract set of rules and settings which allows us
to both define and state rules to maintain a secure smartphone environment. As
seen in Chapter 2, the smartphone, and all its components, needs to be secured
from confidentiality, integrity, availability and privacy viewpoints, as well as all the
information flow on the device needs to be regulated. In this chapter, we make
use of lessons learnt from Chapters 4, 5 and 6, to construct a mathematical model
which builds upon the basic confidentiality and integrity models from Chapter 2, to
a customized and comprehensive security model for the smartphone.
9.1 Formal Definitions
First, we distinguish all resources and participants as subjects and/or objects,
denoted by S and O respectively. Where in,
S = {set of all subjects} and
O = {set of all objects}.
Subjects can be an entity which makes (resource) requests,it can be a controlling
party such as user, manufacturer, service provider, etc. or an active process such as
telephony, SMS, GPS, browser, camera, e-wallet, microphone, near-field detection,
etc.
Objects can be any passive (requested) resource such as log files, memory, control
switches, etc. and user data such as images, memos, contact book, audio/video,
etc. with one or more copies as well as a multithreaded or unthreaded subject that
is requested, for example a process that is invoked by another process. Thus since
S ⊂ O, we use the term “object” to reference to both subjects and/or objects that
are trying to be accessed.
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To each object we then assign confidentiality, integrity and availability levels for
each s ∈ S.
let all Confidentiality Levels be represented by C ∈ Z+
let all Integrity Levels be represented by I ∈ Z+
let all Availability Levels be represented by A ∈ Z+.
For each object x ∈ S ∪O
con(x) = ((C× P(S))× (C× P(S))× · · · × (C× P(S))).
int(x) = ((I× P(S))× (I× P(S))× · · · × (I× P(S))).
avl(x) = ((A× P(S))× (A× P(S))× · · · × (A× P(S))).
where con(x), int(x) and avl(x) are the confidentiality, integrity and availability
values for x. In particular,
con(x) = ((c1, C1), (c2, C2), ..., (cn1 , Cn1))
int(x) = ((i1, I1), (i2, I2), ..., (in2 , In2))
avl(x) = ((a1,A1), (a2,A2), ..., (an3 ,An3))
where the Ci are pairwise disjoint subsets of S ∪O whose union is S ∪O. Similarly Ii
and Aj are pairwise disjoint subsets of S ∪ O whose union is S ∪ O. As an example
let browser ∈ O ∪ S and user , third part application (tpa) ∈ S, using these entities
a mock security levels would be:
con(browser) = ((LUKE, user, tpa), (NIL, other))
int(browser) = ((HIGH, user), (LOW, tpa), (NIL, other))
avl(browser) = ((HIGH, user), (LUKE, tpa), (NIL, other))
We define function F , such that for all s ∈ S, x ∈ S ∪O
F(con(x), s) = t where (t, s) ∈ con(x)
F(int(x), s) = u where (u, s) ∈ int(x)
F(avl(x), s) = v where (v, s) ∈ avl(x)
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For example, we use the case of the browser object:
F(con(browser), tpa) = LUKE
F(int(browser), tpa) = LOW
F(avl(browser), user) = HIGH
For any object, prior to being allowed access by a subject, the security monitor
mediates on the current security level of the object. three matrices have to be decided
and assigned to them by the security monitor. When a object is currently being used
by one or more processes, then each usage by subject Sj will have an associated
confidentiality level cj, integrity level ij, and availability level aj. If there are k active
instances of object x, then the current use of x, denoted by cur(x), is a k-tuple where
each ”coordinate of the k-tuple” is itself a 4-tuple. Thus cur(x) is
cur(x) = ((c1, i1, a1, S1), (c2, i2, a2, S2), ..., (ck, ik, ak, Sk)).
As an example, suppose the browser is being currently run by a third party ap-
plication, thus
cur(browser) = ((LUKE,LOW,LUKE, user)).
Now assume that the user requests for access, and owing to higher availability metric,
is given access. In the case where the user subject is given access besides the active
tpa, the user entry is ( appended) to cur(browser):
cur(browser) = ((LUKE,LOW,LUKE, tpa), (LUKE,HIGH,HIGH, user)).
Else if user is given access over tpa, and the tpa access is terminated, cur(browser)
will change to
cur(browser) = ((LUKE,HIGH,HIGH, user)).
Lastly, each entity also has a property file associated with it, which is created
during installation, and modified at each access. We denote this file by prop(x) for
each x ∈ S ∪O. The content of propx are given in Tables 9.1 and 9.2.
61
Table 9.1: Property list for subjects
Subjects
signature Sig
Signer signer PK
multi-thread (yes/no)
thumbprint of x H(x)
installed time time
log of accesses log file
Table 9.2: Property list for objects less
subjects
Objects less Subjects
signature Sig
owner owner PK
access table table
time created time
time modified time
log of accesses log file
number of allowed copies N
duplication allowed (yes/no)
Each subject has a thumbprint which is the hash of the binary file, this is to
authenticate that the software has not be modified. The subject is signed by the
developer, and the property file contains the public key of the signing source. Ap-
plications can be multithreaded, in which case several other subjects can access it
simultaneously, though with shared memory. Time of installation and log of accesses
are stored so that at a later point they can be retraced in order to validate its au-
thenticity, all actions done on a subject can be recreated.
All passive objects are signed by the owner, so that owner access can be authen-
ticated. The access table (detailed in Section 9.2 provides other subjects that can
access it. Time created, time modified and log of accesses is to retrace security at-
tacks. If two subjects need write access to it, multiple copies of the object be made
up to N copies if duplication is allowed.
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9.2 Access Table for Entities Unique to the Smartphone
Unlike a generic computer setting and its corresponding security model, a smart-
phone is specialized to support certain necessary functionalities, and so a smartphone
security model must address these functionalities/applications as special cases.
Table 9.3 lists the applications special to the smartphone, along with some of their
key attributes. Applications such as telephony, texting, global positioning system,
electronic wallet and bluetooth, are hardware constrained and only one instance of
each can be active at any given time. However, it is still possible for multiple subjects
to be allowed access to them each sharing a time multiplexed form of the resource.
For this reason, these applications are written as having multiple active copies.
Our goal here is to model security on a smartphone, thus we MUST protect those
subjects and objects that are unique to the smartphone. In Table 9.3 we distinguish
and categorize the different objects that are often present on smartphones, and which
need to be protected. For each of these objects, we ask ourselves that consider a
subject s ∈ S which wishes to access an object/ subject x ∈ {S ∪ O}, under what
criteria will s accessing o, be allowed?
We now consider access rules based on these special applications as listed in Table
9.3 all of which belong to S ∪O, and see under what conditions can they be accessed
and by which subjects.
Telephony
The most important task for a smartphone is the telephony process which allows
users to make and receive phone calls. The two actions associated with telephony
(TEL) are to make call or receive call. Both sending and receiving a call can cause
money being charged to the user. Thus the user needs to sign off on the calls and
the permissions for doing so cannot be handed off to applications without explicit
user (USR) consent each time. Further a great concern would be that some rouge
application was created and distributed that spammed the cellular telephone network,
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Table 9.3: List of subjects and objects
Entity Abbr. Type Multi- Copies
Threaded *time-sliced
telephony TEL S No Y es∗
texting TXT S No Y es∗
manufacturer S S No No
kernel KRN S No No
user USR S No No
cellular service provider CSP S No No
global positioning system GPS S No Y es∗
electronic wallet EWA S No Y es∗
core device applications CDA S Y es Y es
trusted third party applications TTA S Y es Y es
third party applications TPA S Y es Y es
user data item UDI O \ S Y es Y es
bluetooth BLU O \ S Y es Y es∗
physical link: Firewire/USB PHL O \ S Y es Y es∗
thus limiting usage to others. By limiting subjects that can make calls via telephony
(TEL), we can preserve the cellular network from attacks via the device even if all
other applications on the device has been compromised.
One application that may need to access telephony is the record (REC) applica-
tion, which would make a copy/transcript of a call. In such cases, and in using TEL
in general, the calling subject can obtain access of resources such as call logs, contact
book and voicemail, which includes reading and deleting them.
Also observe that the user (USR) consent should be explicitly required before
an incoming call is picked up, as it could otherwise lead to attacks such as remote
attacker stealthy listening into a user’s environment. Hence, telephony (TEL) on the
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device should be a protected functionality and its access should be restricted the user
(USR) or any application working on behalf of the user such as handsfree application
(HSF).
Moreover subjects such as manufacturer (MAN) and service provider (CSP) should
be barred access and control of telephony on the device, even though they each can
still make changes to the software installed and the call connections respectively. The
access set that is allowed to access telephony is: {user, Handsfree Application, Call
Recording Application}.
Table 9.4 outlines the subjects that can access TEL, as well as what access types
are granted. and the corresponding cur(TEL) before and after access is granted.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the access policy.
Table 9.4: Access to telephony
calling entity access type permission
user make/receive call allowed
handsfree app. make/recieve call allowed
call record app. make call disallowed
call record app. receive call allowed
Texting (SMS)
Another important task for a smartphone is the SMS/TXT process which allows
users to make and receive text messages. The SMS application is by default always
allowed access to objects such as Address Book and SMS logs. Also, the SMS appli-
cation has the right to call or invoke the System Alert object in order to notify the
user. However, given the instances of potential malware attacks via SMS not all sub-
jects calling SMS can be expected to given an object handle to the SMS application
running in its full capability. Here Core Device Applications (CDA) is a reference
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Fig. 9.1.: Accessing telephony
to applications that include camera, browser and email clients. While Trusted Third
Party Applications (TTA) can include applications such as for social networking. Not
unlike the TEL functionality, the SMS or simply texting (TXT)application can cause
charges to the user when texts are sent or received. However, contrary to telephony
where the authorized subjects can choose to take or decline a call. The application is
always open to receiving a message unless the application is disabled. Also the texting
(TXT) application and in turn any subject calling it has hold of objects such as con-
tact book and sms/mms logs, which includes reading or deleting them. Hence once
again TXT on the device should be a protected functionality and its access should
be restricted the user (USR) or any application working on behalf of the user such
as handsfee application (HSF). Once again subjects such as manufacturer (MAN)
and service provider (CSP) should be barred access and control of telephony on the
device, even though they each can still make changes to the software installed and
the call connections respectively.
The texting send nor the receive feature should not be multi-threaded nor du-
plicated. The texting send feature is reserved primarily for user, but allowed under
certain circumstances, as detailed below. The receive feature is reserved as well pri-
marily for user, all other allowed received functions to TXT are described below.
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Table 9.5 outlines the subjects that can access TEL, as well as what access types
are granted. and the corresponding cur(TEL) before and after access is granted.
Figure 9.2 illustrates the access policy.
Table 9.5: Subject access to texting
calling entity access type permission
user send/read allowed
handsfree app. send/read allowed
CDA send allowed
CDA read disallowed
TPA send allowed
TPA read disallowed
other send/read disallowed
Fig. 9.2.: Accessing texting
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Kernel/Trusted Computing Base
One of the many functions of the Kernel is that it enforces all rules and policies,
thus it is the security monitor of the smartphone. Clearly, any breach to kernel access
will impact the security of the device. The kernel is the trusted computing base of
the smartphone and its confidentiality, integrity and availability must be preserved
at all times by policy. In terms of confidentiality, no unauthorized subject can read
kernel level data. By preserving integrity, no unauthorized subject can read write
to kernel level data. Regarding availability, no low-trust process can lock/reserve
subjects and objects that a kernel process requires. The kernel cannot be modified,
except under strict process initiated by the manufacturer or manufacturer authorized
software. The access set that is allowed to access the kernel is:: { MAN }.
In regards to prop(KRN), there is no threading nor duplicate copies available of
the kernel. The following table outlines the subjects that can access KRN, as well
as under what circumstances it is granted. and the corresponding cur(KRN) before
and after access is granted.
Table 9.6: Access to kernel
calling entity access type permission
MAN read/write allowed
other read/write disallowed
Global Positioning System/Location Database
Global Positioning System (GPS) has the capability of identifying current loca-
tion information, as well as other functionalities, as well as reading and writing this
information to the location database. Though other applications may request current
location information, they should do so by invoking a feature of the GPS application
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rather than directly access the location database. Consequently, access to the location
database should be restricted to the GPS subject. Access to the GPS subject would
need to be allowed to a category of third party applications. However when called
upon by subjects of different capabilities, the GPS itself would escalate or reduce
its own capabilities and access to records, dependent on the subject’s trust level who
invokes GPS. Hence altering the portion of records allowed to be accessed. In all GPS
can be invoked from a range of subjects, the user (USR) and manufacturer (MAN) to
permitted trusted third party applications (TPA). Lastly, the GPS application is the
sole subject that can use the GPS-Satellite channel, which too must be considered to
be at the same trust level. The access set that is allowed to access GPS is: {MAN,
KRN, USR, EWA, CDA, TTA}.
Location based information is very sensitive information and should not be re-
vealed nor should it flow to other parties as seen in Section 7.3. Thus access to GPS
services needs to be closely monitored.
Table 9.7 outlines the subjects that can access GPS, as well as under what cir-
cumstances it is granted. and the corresponding cur(GPS) before and after access is
granted.
Table 9.7: Access to GPS
calling entity access type permission
MAN read allowed
KRN read allowed
USR read allowed
EWA read allowed
CDA read allowed
TTA read allowed
other read/write disallowed
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Fig. 9.3.: Accessing GPS
Electronic Wallet
Electronic Wallet, also called e-wallet, (EWA) will consist of a number of features–
banking, credit cards, keys (car, home,...), personal identifications (driver license,
passport,...), etc., providing capability of electronic transactions, as well as a number
of other features. Sensitive files will be accessible to this feature, thus access to the e-
wallet functionality must be closely safeguarded. The only way to seal of the e-wallet
(EWA) from being invoked by less trusted applications requiring its services, is to
allow only the e-wallet to access other applications, and never the other way around.
The e-wallet should only be accessed by the user (USR) or processes can ask the
kernel to invoke it on its behalf. In effect, for every transaction the user invokes the
e-wallet and directs it to the application requiring the transaction - may it be some
webpage or application store portal.
The e-wallet (EWA) thus acts in highly trusted user mode, and communicates off
device via its own SSL connections. The access set that is allowed to access electronic
wallet is: { KRN, USR }.
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Table 9.8 outlines the subjects that can access EWA, as well as under what cir-
cumstances it is granted. and the corresponding cur(EWA) before and after access
is granted.
Table 9.8: Access to electronic wallet
calling entity access type permission
KRN write allowed
USR read/write allowed
other read/write disallowed
Fig. 9.4.: Accessing electronic wallet
Core Device Applications
Applications such as the browser, email client, camera and audio player are ex-
amples of core device applications (CDA). These applications all belong on the same
confidentiality, integrity and availability levels, since they consistently require each
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others’ services and data from one another, they can be accessed to be used by another
core device application. When data is being accessed from any of these applications
by another (one of the CDA is acting as a subject), these CDA objects need to all be in
a high trust status. When a higher ranked application such as telephony, SMS/MMS,
GPS or EWA is the authorized subject accessing a CDA object, then such applica-
tions can only a read access to a portion of the CDA resource. This is because, even
though the subjects have higher rankings, in case they are compromised they should
not be a allowed to execute or write all other applications. The access set that is
allowed to access core device applications is: {KRN, MAN, USR, GPS, EWA, TTA}.
Table 9.9: Access to core device applications
calling entity access type permission
KRN write allowed
MAN read/write allowed
USR write allowed
GPS read/write allowed
EWA write allowed
TTA read/write allowed
other read/write disallowed
Third Party Applications
Third Party Application can be come from various sources, and in a generic smart-
phone model they can be installed via several different channels. They can be under
different credibility ranking, which we will simply generalize as Trusted Third Party
Applications (TTA) or Less Trusted Third Party Applications (TPA), though all
lower than Core Device Applications. In general particular data items associated
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with an application are to be sandboxed by default unless they are explicitly de-
clared to be shared with different applications and had obtained permission to do
so. Also, to preserve credibility, lower applications cannot read, modify or execute
higher applications. To preserve integrity, lower applications cannot write to higher
applications. And to preserve availability, higher applications have higher priority in
accessing resources than lower applications. The access set that is allowed to access
trusted third party applications (TTA) is: { KRN, USR, EWA }.
Table 9.10: Access to trusted third party applications
calling entity access type permission
TEL write allowed
KRN write allowed
USR write allowed
EWA write allowed
other read/write disallowed
Table 9.11: Access to third party application
calling entity access type permission
KRN write allowed
USR write allowed
EWA write allowed
TTA read/write allowed
other read/write disallowed
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User Data Items
Private Data Items belonging the user consists of passive objects such as pictures,
songs, saved Wifi settings, contacts, themes and wallpapers, password file, games
scores, ’clipboard’, etc. As it can be seen all of these data items are likely to be
associated with one or more subjects, and must thus operate at the same level as the
uniformly ranked subjects. The subjects have to be brought to the same level when
accessing a common resource, which cannot be sequestered. The access set that is
allowed to access user data item is: { any subject with the same trust level}.
Table 9.12: Access to user data item
calling entity access type permission
any authorized subject read/write allowed
Bluetooth
Bluetooth is to be used by trusted third party applications such as wireless head-
sets. These application must use application layer encryption to create secure com-
munication To remote controlling no core application use this channels. The kernel
must access the bluetooth channel to monitor its activity as well as periodically switch
it on or off. The user too ofcourse can physically turn it off or on The access set that
is allowed to access bluetooth is: { USR, KRN, TTA}.
Physical Link: Firewire/USB
The physical link is to be used for both system and data backup The backup
application is expected to to establish a secure connection and encrypt data being
transferred The access set that is allowed to access physical link is: {KRN, USR,
UDI, TTA, TPA}.
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Table 9.13: Access to Bluetooth
calling entity access type permission
KRN write allowed
USR write allowed
TTA read/write allowed
other read/write disallowed
Table 9.14: Access to physical link
calling entity access type permission
KRN write allowed
USR write allowed
UDI write allowed
TTA read/write allowed
TPA read/write allowed
other read/write disallowed
9.3 Mechanism: Installer
The installer is part of the Trusted Computing Base, and can not be modified by
any party but the manufacturer. It is single threaded and only one copy exists at any
given time. It is a special application because it needs to access objects belonging
to all trust levels. Also, the only party invoking the installer is the user. The user
not only calls the installer for application installation, but also for providing install
time user permission. These are permission that the application requests for, by the
device is not the authority in approving them on behalf of the user.
As seen, all applications need a to be signed. This necessities the presence of a
Public Key Infrastructure, which means that all application developers, from the very
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trusted manufacturer to the least trusted third party application market developer,
need to first obtain a signing key. It is possible that the user may want to install an
application directly to the smartphone, in which case the application will be installed
using the users keys. For this the user will obtain his/her key at device registration
with manufacturer.
Once the installer unpacks an application x, it creates prop(x) reading its at-
tributes. For fields in the property file where values are unknown, it defaults to
minimum values. The installer also reads the requested permissions, and generates
con(x), int(x) and avl(x), setting the context for all subjects s ∈ S in which they
can access x
The installer also looks for a privacy policy file in the application package. The
installer can then process the privacy information and display it in a user-friendly
format of a privacy grid or highlight privacy concerns.
The above installer actions are illustrated in Figure 9.5
9.4 Mechanism: Security Monitor
For any subject s to access any subject/object o, the access control is performed
by the security monitor, which is part of the Trusted Computing Base. The role
of the security monitor is to authenticate each access following a three stage veri-
fication, namely: 1) check for authenticity, 2)check for availability, and 3)check for
confidentiality and integrity. In Figure 9.6 we see the overall flowchart on monitoring
access control. Each stage has an associated algorithm and each fits into a category of
checking for authenticity, availability or confidentiality and integrity. We now discuss
the purpose and mechanism behind these three classifications.
Checking for Authenticity
To check for authenticity, the security monitor first looks at the access Table 1
associated with object x to ensure that the access is permitted by the x’s policy
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Fig. 9.5.: Installation mechanism
developer. The access tables for all distinct smartphone objects are given in Section
9.2.
Algorithm 1 Table Lookup
Input x, calling entity, x.access table, access type
Output allow/disallow
1: return x.access table(calling entity, access type).permission
The second step is to create a hash of the application binary and compare it with
the pre-stored hash (see Algorithm 2) to see if it has been modified. Applications
are allowed to me modified, but when they are modified by authorized parties, their
property file’s also modified.
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Algorithm 2 Hash Check
Input x, prop(x)
Output yes/no
1: y = Hash(x)
2: return y ⊕ prop(x).H(x)
Lastly, the signature of the developer/modifier is verified by the signers public key
as per Algorithm 3. Though signature checking happens during installation, this is
part of the policy for complete mediation.
Algorithm 3 Signature Verify
Input x, prop(x)
Output yes/no
1: return Signature Verify(Sig, x, Signer PK)
Checking for Availability
To check for availability, the security monitor first checks if any copies of resource
x is available, or if resource x is multithreaded. This check is done by Algorithm 4. If
the resource is multi-threaded, then the resource is always available. If it has a limit
on the number of copies that can be made, and that limit has not exceeded then it is
still available, else it moves on to the Algorithm 5 for decision on availability.
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Algorithm 4 Resource Available
Input cur(x), prop(x)
Output yes/no
1: if prop(x).multithreaded = TRUE then
2: return TRUE
3: N = number of calling entities in cur(x)
4: if N > prop(x).num of copies then
5: return TRUE
6: return FALSE
Before arriving at this later algorithm, it is already decided that all available copies
of object x have been taken up. It is also know that these copies are sequestered and
independent, and can be shared by subjects of varying trust levels. Algorithm 5, thus
decides if the availability index (avl) of the current subject dominates the availability
of the lowest ranked subject. If true, then the subject with lowest availability ranking
is dropped and the current subject is moved to next sequence of decisions; if false
then the current subject is dropped.
Algorithm 5 Decision on Availability
Input x, cur(x)
Output yes/no
1: tmp = HIGH
2: For all y ∈ cur(x).calling entities
3: if avl(y) < tmp then
4: tmp = avl(y)
5: if avl(y) < avl(x) then
6: Drop y
7: return TRUE
8: return FALSE
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Checking for Confidentiality and Integrity
For all subject/objects, one or more copies can be active at the same time, each
independent and sequestered from each other. The knowledge of how many copies
can be available and and how they are to be rationed is to be used to determine
availability.
We also observe that some subject/objects, can be ‘multi-threaded’. We use the
term multi-threaded to mean that different instances can it be created with memory
shared in-between them, such that multiple subjects can grab different threads of
an object simultaneously. However, if all subjects accessing an threads of an object
do not belong to the same security level, then information flowing between different
security levels will reduce all subjects to the level of the subject with lowest security.
Figure 9.7 which illustrates the importance of sequestering. The illustration shows the
potential risk if two subjects (one low level the other high level) access the same object.
Depending on the security metric, information flow from high confidential object to
one of low confidentiality, degrades the high level objects. Similarly information flow
from low integrity to high integrity brings the high level object to the low one’s
integrity level.
Fig. 9.7.: Threaded object shared between subjects of different trust
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Before making decisions based on confidentiality and integrity in Algorithm 6, it is
known that either a thread or a copy of object x is available. However, this availability
could have been decided on either multiple copies or multiple threads being available.
If it is the case of multiple sequestered copies, then any allowed subject irrelevant
of confidentiality and integrity levels can access it. Else, it is know that all the the
subjects currently accessing the threads are of the same confidentiality and integrity
levels. If the current subject has either lesser confidentiality or integrity, then it is
dropped. If it is higher in both trust indices, then all subjects presently accessing the
object’s threads are dropped.
9.5 Mechanism: Applications Marketplace
Unauthorized third-party code can be prevented by making code mandatory to
be signed, this way any file an exploit is able to write out to disk will not be allowed
to be executed by the kernel.
There should always exist certificate authority who will sign the code before it
can be distributed. Prior to installation on device, the software package should be
validated by verifying the digital signature, confirming the legitimacy of permissions
requested and check the files contained in the package. It should also look for a
privacy policy file which is sufficiently completed as per standard guidelines and see
that it can be viewed by the user.
The package installer on behalf of the user should be able to decline a subset
of requested permissions, depending on a system wide device security settings that
the user wants the device to maintain. By approving permissions or small groups of
permissions individually there is less risk of an application maliciously misusing the
permissions granted to it.
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Algorithm 6 Decision on Confidentiality & Integrity
Input x, cur(x), calling entity
Output yes/no
1: if prop(x).multithreaded = FALSE then
2: append log in property file
3: return TRUE
4: . Current calling entities are sharing memory and thus have equal con & int
5: For any y ∈ cur(x)
6: if F(con(x), calling entity) 6= F(con(x), y) then
7: if avl(calling entity) > avl(y) then
8: Drop all active processes in cur(x)
9: append log in property file
10: return TRUE
11: append log in property file
12: return FALSE
13: if F(int(x), calling entity) 6= F(int(x), y) then
14: if avl(calling entity) > avl(y) then
15: Drop all active processes in cur(x)
16: append log in property file
17: return TRUE
18: append log in property file
19: return FALSE
20: Append calling entity to cur(x)
21: append log in property file
22: return TRUE
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Fig. 9.8.: Closed application market
Fig. 9.9.: Public key infrastructure for application distribution
9.6 Mechanism: Securing Backup, Syncing and Data Transfers
Most smartphone have their own desktop software such as iTunes and Win-
dows Zune to provide interface for the smartphone to the PC. However, as seen
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in Section7.2, such software cannot be relied on to provide necessary security fea-
tures. All smartphones also do not allow access the the phone’s filesystem externally.
While some like Windows Phone, can allow external communication via the cloud.
Whatever the case, security features should be implemented by the device itself.
Fig. 9.10.: User signing confidential user data
Data on the device can be broken into application data, user data, and confiden-
tial user data. In case of application data, it should always be backed up as a signed
package. Upon installation the signature is then verified. User data in general should
be always encrypted before being sent outside the device, to secure it on the commu-
nication channel as well as external storage. Confidential user data include financial,
location, and other privacy sensitive information used by special applications such as
E-Wallet and GPS. Since confidential user data needs higher security and is also tied
more the the individual rather than the device, it should be encrypted and signed
by the a personal special set of user keys while on device. When transferred outside
the device, user keys are no longer available, and so the data should be encrypted
and locked under a user passphrase. While on device, when the device is handed
off to another user, this personal secret key is overwritten with a newly generate
user key, upon users prompt, and the confidential user data encrypted with it are
deleted/overwritten by newer data. Data access to confidential data should follow
the given verification as shown in Figure 9.10.
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10. RESULT ANALYSIS
In Chapter 5 we categorized and discussed smartphone threats in ten categories. We
then discussed security policies, model and mechanisms which can counteract against
these threats. In this chapter we analyze the means and effectiveness of our proposed
measures. For each, we revisit the threat, discuss how it is subverted, briefly state a
sample attack and follow up with a series of security steps that show why the attack
cannot happen. The table below each threat, is hence a sequence of security measures
counteracting the attack at every stage.
Before that we recall our assumptions that trusted computing base is a protected
entity, consisting of the kernel, filesystem and installer, that all proposed security
mechanisms are implemented and the manufacturer has correctly handled secure
bootloading and firmware security. We also maintain that there is secure storage
on the device to be storing property files for all objects loaded on the smartphone.
Threat 5.1: The larger the attack surface for a smartphone, the more likely that it
will be exploited.
The smartphone attack surface is the collection of inputs, protocols, interfaces and
services. The challenge was thus to limit the attack surface without decreasing func-
tionality. For this we designed a secure smartphone operating system at an abstract
level, which unlike prevailing smartphones is not reduced from a bigger operating
system. We also defined security in terms of the special smartphone applications,
giving each a unique consideration in terms of access and modification rights. We
now run an sample attack on how the threat of wide attack surface can be violated.
One of the trusted native applications which is most open to outside parties is the
browser. Suppose an attacker wishes to execute untrusted code on the browser, she
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would need to bypass the security steps in following attack example of a nefarious
program trying to install software via the browser.
We now follows the sequence of countermeasures against Threat 5.1:
1: program runs code on browser to get installed
2: browser request for access to installer to security monitor
3: security monitor checks if the installer is not previously engaged as per Figure 9.6
4: the installer can only be called by the user, hence the user is notified as per Figure
9.5
5: if the user agrees, the program is installed under user signature with minimum
privileges of untrusted third party application, that user signed code receive as
per Figure 9.9
6: if the user see that the installation is unintended then the installation is rejected,
a log entry is made of the browser breach as per Algorithm 6
Threat 5.2: With the growing amount of sensitive data being stored on a smartphone,
and the corresponding lack of security in storage, communication and application
installation, the smartphone is open to data theft.
In order to prevent disclosure of information or privacy leaks via applications we
decided on two policies and mechanisms. First we decided that the installer should
read and display the privacy policy for any application prior to installation. We also
stated that the user has the choice of agreeing to a subset of privacy rights that the
application is seeking. As a second mechanism, we paired each confidential data file
with a secure application, such as financial data with e-wallet and location data with
the GPS application, and made the application the sole interface for data access. We
also defined access rules for special applications limiting read and write to them, while
allowing them to read and write to approved subjects/objects.We now demonstrate
an example where a nefarious application attempts to obtain trusted third party
application status and leak location data from the device.
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We now follows the sequence of countermeasures against Threat 5.2:
1: Application tries to obtain certification from a trusted market place as per Figure
9.8
2: Application is verified and its privacy policy is cross checked with its binary
execution
3: Application is packaged and signed along with the certificate
4: Installer verifies the signature and signer, unpacks the application, displays pri-
vacy policy to user, as per Figure 9.5
5: User approves to a subset of permissions.
6: Installer create property file and install application as per Figure 9.5
Threat 5.3: Security mechanisms are easier to bypass if authentication and Verifi-
cation is not done more rigourously.
We stated in Threat 5.3, that security mechanisms are at risk of being fooled
with false data and that the biggest threat for spoofing with false data, is to over-
ride/trick security checks. In response we outlined the security monitor to check
every subject/object against stored hashes as well as the signatures on them. We
also stated the concept of the secure storage for property files and of an independent
non-tamperable security monitor. Let us take the example of a third party applica-
tion (TPA) trying to access a user data item (UDI). Let us assume that this TPA
had asked for such access rights at installation as per Table 9.12.
We now follows the sequence of countermeasures against Threat 5.3:
1: Application passes request to security monitor which will authorize it through a
multi-step verification from Figure 9.6
2: Security Monitor verifies authenticity and compares against Access Table lookup
(Algorithm 1), signature checking (Algorithm 3) and hash check (Algorithm 2)
3: Security Monitor ascertains if a copy of the data item would be available through
Algorithms 4 and 5
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Threat 5.4: Malicious parties can seize control by disrupting the secure flow of
operations.
Once again to avoid disruption of correct operation, we define the actions of
the security monitor to be atomic and secure. We also make every access to be
communicated down to the security monitor. Also, adhering to the principle of fail-
safe defaults, we deny all access unless approved on every access basis by the monitor.
An example of this is a trusted third party application trying to access a single
threaded application while the later is in use.
We now follows the sequence of countermeasures against Threat 5.4:
1: Application passes request to security monitor which will authorize it through a
multi-step verification from Figure 9.6
2: Security Monitor verifies authenticity and compares against Access Table lookup
(Algorithm 1), signature checking (Algorithm 3) and hash check (Algorithm 2)
3: Security Monitor ascertains if the object would be available through Algorithms
4 and 5
4: Security Monitor ascertains if application is in high enough confidentiality and
integrity level for the object through Algorithm 6.
Threat 5.5: If the system is partitioned into different security levels, a vulnerability
in any one of them can allow for access and control of all code running at that level.
For unauthorized control of part of the device, we prevent user space hacks can
that can let a malicious code allow access to the entire filesystem by making the
filesystem a part of the protected trusted computing base. The trusted computing
base functions at kernel trust level, and the kernel access table and protections are
applied to it. The example for this follows closely with that for the last two threats.
In this case the object being accessed is the filesystem, and being part of the trusted
computing base, it follows the same access rules as for the kernel. Hence, only the
manufacturer is allowed to modify it.
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Threat 5.6: The smartphone is vulnerable to being highjacked via cellular network
botnets.
We stated that smartphones botnets can exploit both cellular and internet con-
nectivity in tandem increasing threats to the cellular network. For this we made
special access rules for telephony making it accessibly only by user permission. It
could be argued that indirect access by certain applications may enhance function-
ality. However given that the cellular network causes charges to the user, that the
cellular network is more rigid and vulnerable to botnet attacks, and that cellular
connection are not behind protected networks, it is necessary that the user is the sole
accessor to the telephony functionality. As an example, let us see how a handsfree
application working on behalf of the user operates.
We now follows the sequence of countermeasures against Threat 5.6:
1: The user calls the hands-free application
2: Hands free application obtain access to telephony
3: Contacts, call records and other telephony user data files are preserved behind
the telephony application
4: The hands-free application quits once user gives up control
Threat 5.7: By now allowing certain amount of flexibility in application development
and installation, users may instead willing bypass security mechanisms introducing
more vulnerabilities.
We noted that each smartphone vendor has different mechanisms of application
distribution in Threat 5.7. Also that very restrictive marketplace lead to jailbreaking,
while no system for certification and quality checking is plan in harmful for the device
widening the attack surface. For this we designed an application market place de-
signed upon public key infrastructure distinguishing between trusted and uncertified
third party applications. We also incorporated manufacturer certified applications,
making them most trusted and user approved ones, which though allowed have least
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privileges. How the user can authorize unsigned applications by themselves or other
developers, and install them as an untrusted third party application is shown in Figure
9.9.
Threat 5.8: The smartphone is vulnerable to application layer malwares
We stated that application layer malware is any piece of code that opens up vulner-
abilities - remotely control the device, modify the filesystem, exposing confined data
or installing rootkit. Though each of these threats have been addressed separately.
A more general solution against malwares of all kinds was proposed to maintain a
security access log in the security monitor so as to later be able to analyze malware
activities. This is shown in Figure 9.6 and Algorithm 6.
Threat 5.9: The smartphone is vulnerable to rootkits.
Kernel level malware or rootkits exploited vulnerabilities in the operating system
level. For this we kernel only accessible by the manufacturer (see Table 9.6), and give
no read or write access to any other party to the kernel.
Threat 5.10: Insecure data transfer.
Lastly, we stated that while data transferring outside the device, could lead to
both contamination/unauthorized modification of data, as well as loss of sensitive
information. For this we define mechanism for applications, data and confidential
data traveling outside the device under any communication channel and protocol.
Recall that for data to travel outside the device it should fulfil the following steps.
We now follows the sequence of countermeasures against Threat 5.10:
1: The application should notify user for invoking permission to transfer
2: The data should be encrypted
3: If it is being backed up, then it should be stored under a user passphrase
4: If it confidential user data, then it should be signed with user keys
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11. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis we have analyzed smartphone security and have proposed new security
model and mechanisms for the smartphone platform, based on privacy, integrity and
availability. We analyzed our model, to show it circumvents previously experienced
and future foreseeable threats and attacks on the smartphone.
We introduced the smartphone and its applications from a security perspective.
Specifically, we emphasized the growing popularity and changing trends in smart-
phone applications which increase the need for security features protecting user infor-
mation and identity. Then, we discussed and compared how prevailing smartphone
brands address security on their devices. We collected, consolidated and summa-
rized ten categories of smartphone threats and vulnerabilities as witnessed in the
smartphone security scene since its inception in the consumer markets. We based the
resolvement of these ten threats as the goal for our policies, model and mechanism in
the chapters that follow. After that, we briefly discussed the existing research focus on
enforcing security on smartphones, and we see that almost all works focus on adding
security enhancements on top of an existing platform. We distinguished our work as
a bottom-up-approach in redefining a secure smartphone environment, with empha-
sis on its special applications. We developed security policies which are targeted to
address the security shortcomings and need that were previously presented. We used
these policies as the basis to develop a formal model defining how security measures
can be systematically built into the system. We also proposed accompanying security
mechanisms, which will ensure that all applications and stakeholders and protected.
Finally, we analyzed the effectiveness of our work in the light of the threats that were
discussed.
For the future, this work can be expanded by creating and testing a small scale im-
plementation of the model. Though we believe the model is at par with current smart-
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phone performances, through implementing the proposed model and mechanisms the
empirical efficiency and viability of the design can be tested. Also, a method of faster
signature checking, such as elliptic curve cryptography can be added to the model.
Lastly, decisions on the precise implementation of our methods which are described at
an abstract level need to be made based on various situational, corporate and market
factors.
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